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User-Friendly Taxpaying 
KATHLEEN DELANEY THOMAS* 
Technology is revolutionizing our lives. With the touch of a button or a simple voice 
command, we can instantly order groceries, get directions, or find the nearest sushi 
restaurant. Sensibly, the private sector has capitalized on these recent innovations 
to drive up profits. To sell more laundry detergent, Amazon now enables consumers 
to order refills by simply pressing the “dash button” mounted above their laundry 
machines. Starbucks lures more customers by allowing them to pre-order online and 
have their drink waiting when they arrive at the store. The theory behind this ap-
proach is simple: if you want someone to use your product or service, you should 
make it as quick and easy as possible for them to do so.  
This Article makes a novel argument to extend this line of reasoning to encourage 
better compliance with the tax laws. In making this argument, the Article draws upon 
behavioral science research showing that complexity impacts individuals’ decision 
making and encourages dishonesty. The Article then offers a number of proposals 
for how policy makers could simplify individuals’ interactions with the tax system. 
For example, the IRS could allow taxpayers to easily record their income and deduc-
tions online during the year using smart phones or tablets. Those items could be 
stored in an online personal taxpayer account and, at the end of the year, automati-
cally uploaded to an electronic return. Easing the burden of taxpaying should 
encourage more taxpayers to report honestly, in addition to reducing their compli-
ance costs. In the same way that designing products or websites to be user-friendly 
encourages their use, making the tax system more user-friendly should attract more 
voluntary participation.  
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User-friendly (adjective): Easy to learn, use, understand, or deal with. 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. tax system relies on voluntary participation.1 Every year, the 
government asks taxpayers to honestly report how much income they’ve earned and 
pay any taxes that were not previously withheld or otherwise paid. Because the IRS 
cannot feasibly audit every taxpayer and detect all instances of noncompliance, pol-
icy makers try to encourage people to report honestly of their own accord. And while 
many taxpayers fully comply, the government still comes up short by billions of dol-
lars each year from those who don’t.2 Scholars have argued that we can encourage 
more voluntary tax compliance by getting to the root cause of why people cheat on 
their taxes. For example, some have suggested that people intentionally evade be-
cause they think the tax system is unfair, because they don’t like the way that their 
tax dollars are being spent, because they believe that everyone else is cheating too, 
or because they don’t think they will get caught.3 While all of these theories have 
merit, this Article suggests that there is an additional, less nefarious explanation for 
why some taxpayers don’t pay what they owe: it’s too much work. It contends that 
more taxpayers would willingly report all of their income if doing so weren’t so 
burdensome. 
Our income tax system is notoriously complex. The sheer volume of tax statutes 
and regulations, along with the technical nature of many tax provisions, means that 
many individuals don’t fully comprehend the substance of the tax rules that apply to 
them. This Article refers to this type of tax complexity as substantive complexity. 
Although many scholars and commentators have argued for reforms that would sim-
plify the substance of our tax laws, others have argued that complexity is necessary 
if we want to tax each person according to his or her individual circumstances. For 
example, we use multiple income tax rates instead of a single tax rate so that 
                                                                                                             
 
 1. Some scholars have described the U.S. tax system as “quasi-voluntary.” See, e.g., 
MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE 53–54 (1988). The description is apt because income 
that is reported to the IRS by third parties (like employers or banks) is essentially impossible 
to hide from the IRS. 
 2. The vast majority of income subject to third-party withholding and/or information 
reporting is reported accurately to the IRS. This Article is primarily concerned with income, 
such as that earned in cash or from self-employment, that is not reported to the IRS by third 
parties. Less than half of such income is reported accurately, resulting in over $100 billion of 
lost tax revenue annually. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP FOR TAX YEAR 2006: 
OVERVIEW tbl.1 (2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/8ETE-9SV3]. 
 3. See, e.g., James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 818 (1998); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compli-
ance: Recommendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 614–15 (2007); Leandra Lederman, 
The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 
1468–69 (2003); Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like To Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support 
for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179 (2013); 
Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (2007). 
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wealthier taxpayers will pay a higher proportionate share of their income than lower-
income taxpayers.  
But there is another type of complexity embedded in our tax system that has been 
underexplored in the debate over simplification. Apart from the fact that the sub-
stance of our tax laws is confusing, our interactions with the tax system can also be 
incredibly tedious and burdensome. Even when taxpayers understand the relevant 
legal rules, complying with one’s tax obligations may still entail a complex process, 
such as sifting through pages of forms, reading lengthy instructions, and spending 
hours entering information on returns. This Article refers to this type of tax complex-
ity as procedural complexity. While many taxpayers may be able to avoid the 
substantive complexity of the tax system by relying on tax return preparers or tax-
preparation software to help them determine their tax liability, it is difficult to escape 
the procedural complexity of the system. Even taxpayers who do not prepare their 
own tax returns are responsible for managing their tax affairs, for example by keep-
ing records and collecting year-end information statements. Further, nearly half of 
taxpayers self-prepare their tax returns, resulting in millions of individuals spending 
billions of collective hours each year dealing with the tax system.  
This Article’s core argument is that policy makers could improve tax compliance 
by reducing the procedural complexity of the tax system. The sheer annoyance of the 
taxpaying process—weeding through forms, schedules, and tables at tax time, or 
worrying about which information statements contain reportable income and which 
do not, for example—deters voluntary participation in the system. In many instances, 
taxpayers may conclude that fully complying with their tax obligations requires too 
much effort. This tendency towards laziness is supported by numerous behavioral 
studies.4 
The human brain is hardwired to conserve mental resources. Empirical research 
shows that, given alternative courses of action, individuals consistently prefer the 
one that requires the least amount of mental effort. Studies also show that our brain 
is like a muscle that is subject to fatigue. When we expend mental effort doing things 
like making decisions, resisting temptation, or thinking hard during the course of our 
workday, we exhaust a limited pool of mental energy and become mentally depleted. 
Mental depletion, in turn, affects our behavior. Studies have shown that people who 
are mentally exhausted are more likely to cheat, less able to exhibit self-control, and 
more likely to behave passively.  
These behaviors have important implications for tax compliance for two reasons. 
First, complying with our tax obligations is mentally exhausting, and this is greatly 
exacerbated by the procedural complexity of the tax system. Second, the types of 
behaviors demonstrated by individuals who are mentally depleted—passivity, dis-
honesty, and lack of self-control—are the very behaviors that encourage tax evasion 
and discourage individuals from voluntarily reporting income. The fact that dealing 
with our tax obligations is mentally draining means that taxpayers have less mental 
energy to overcome the temptation to cheat and to report their income accurately. 
Thus, if the government wants to promote better tax compliance, it should make the 
process of taxpaying easier.  
This Article makes several contributions to the existing tax literature. It first 
                                                                                                             
 
 4. These empirical studies are discussed in detail below in Part II. 
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explores an aspect of our tax system that has received relatively little attention from 
legal scholars: procedural complexity. It then applies current behavioral science re-
search to offer an explanation for why procedural complexity may encourage tax 
evasion. The second half of the Article then offers a number of policy proposals for 
reducing the procedural complexity of the tax system. I argue that policy makers 
should draw upon lessons from the private sector, where it is well established that 
consumers demonstrate a strong preference for simplicity. In the same way that 
designing products or websites to be user-friendly encourages their use, making the 
tax system more user-friendly should attract more voluntary participation.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the complexity of the tax system 
and situates the Article within the existing literature on tax complexity. It makes a 
novel contribution to that literature by drawing a distinction between substantive 
complexity and procedural complexity and argues that procedural complexity 
contributes to tax evasion. Part II examines empirical studies on mental depletion 
and its effect on human behavior, while Part III discusses the implications of this 
research for tax compliance. Part IV then offers a number of proposals to reduce the 
procedural complexity of the tax system in order to improve voluntary tax compli-
ance and addresses several potential objections to these proposals. 
I. TAX COMPLEXITY: WHAT IT MEANS AND WHY IT MATTERS 
That our current tax system is complex is uncontroversial.5 Scholarly debate in 
this area generally has centered on how much complexity is justified and how to best 
simplify the tax laws. The focus of this commentary has largely been on the substance 
of the tax laws. After examining the existing tax literature on complexity, this part 
examines another aspect of tax complexity: the complexity of the process of comply-
ing with one’s tax obligations.  
This Part then turns to the relationship between complexity and voluntary tax 
compliance. Scholars have argued that substantive tax complexity may lead to lower 
tax compliance, either by causing taxpayers to make unintentional errors or by 
encouraging outright tax evasion. But procedural tax complexity may also contribute 
to noncompliance. Because the process of managing one’s tax affairs can be so 
burdensome, taxpayers may be more likely to evade their obligations in order to 
avoid the associated effort.  
A. Complexity in the Tax Literature 
A number of tax scholars have explored the complexity of the U.S. tax system in 
detail, describing various aspects of the tax laws that are complex and debating the 
merits of complexity. Before introducing a new framework for thinking about tax 
complexity, this section briefly overviews the existing tax literature on complexity.  
                                                                                                             
 
 5. See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and 
Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV. 121, 123 (1989) (“There is no disagreement about the complexity 
of the Internal Revenue Code.”). 
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1. Meaning of Tax “Complexity” 
Tax scholars have identified multiple facets of tax complexity. First, the legal 
rules governing our tax obligations are complex (referred to here as rule-based 
complexity).6 The Internal Revenue Code itself is complex, as are the Treasury 
regulations, IRS rulings and other forms of administrative guidance, and judicial 
interpretations of the tax laws. The sheer volume of these rules makes them 
complicated. For example, as of June 2000, there were roughly 700 Internal Revenue 
Code sections applicable to individuals and 20,000 pages of Treasury regulations.7 
Technical or unclear language in statutes or other legal rules also adds complexity.8 
And even the most simply drafted and concise legal rules may still be difficult for 
taxpayers to comprehend if their substance involves sophisticated concepts.9 For 
example, rule-based complexity might make it hard for a taxpayer to determine 
whether certain expenses are deductible or whether she qualifies as “head of house-
hold” for income tax filing purposes.10  
Another form of rule-based complexity is computational complexity, a term 
coined by Lawrence Zelenak to describe complicated and burdensome calculations 
such as those involved in computing alternative minimum tax (AMT) liability or 
phaseouts of certain credits and deductions.11 For example, although it may be clear 
to a taxpayer that she is entitled to deduct a “personal exemption” on her tax return, 
computing the amount of that personal exemption may involve substantial computa-
tional complexity because the exemption is gradually phased out as the taxpayer’s 
income increases.12 
Closely related to rule-based complexity is what commentators call structural 
complexity.13 Even if taxpayers understand the tax rules in isolation, structural 
complexity describes the difficulty taxpayers may have in applying the rules to their 
own affairs.14 Take, as an example, a taxpayer who replaces a number of damaged 
windows in her office building with new windows. Although she may understand 
that the tax law allows the cost of building “repairs” to be immediately deducted 
while the cost of building “improvements” must be capitalized (i.e., not currently 
                                                                                                             
 
 6. DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 266–67 (1986). Edward 
McCaffery describes this as “technical complexity,” which is the “pure intellectual difficulty 
of ascertaining the meaning of tax law.” Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax 
Simplification, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267, 1270–71. 
 7. 1 STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., JCS-3-01, STUDY OF THE 
OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 4 (Comm. 
Print. 2001) [hereinafter JCT REPORT]. 
 8. Id. at 5. 
 9. See id. at 101. 
 10. See I.R.C. § 2(b). 
 11. LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE FORM 1040: TWO CHEERS FOR THE 
RETURN-BASED MASS INCOME TAX 113 (2013). 
 12. See I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (West Supp. 2016). 
 13. McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1271; see also BRADFORD, supra note 6, at 267 (“transac-
tional complexity”). 
 14. McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1271. 
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deducted), she may not be certain whether the new windows constitute a repair or an 
improvement.15  
Finally, compliance complexity describes the difficulty taxpayers may face in 
understanding and complying with various filing and recordkeeping requirements.16 
A taxpayer may, for example, know that he is eligible to receive the earned income 
tax credit but not understand which tax form(s) he must file to claim the credit.17  
2. Weighing the Merits of Tax Complexity  
Although there is consensus among scholars that our current tax rules are 
complex, there is some disagreement over whether such complexity is problematic, 
inevitable, or even desirable.18 Many commentators view complexity as a necessary 
component of an income tax that seeks to promote equity, encourage certain behav-
ior, and correct for market externalities in the most efficient manner possible.19 For 
example, some sources of complexity in the tax law—such as personal deductions, 
credits, and exemptions—are a necessary byproduct of taking each individual’s per-
sonal circumstances into account when calculating tax liability.20 Other commenta-
tors see our system as broken and in dire need of simplification.21 This debate largely 
centers on the substance of the tax laws themselves, a problem that generally must 
be remedied by congressional action.22 Many, for example, have urged legislators to 
                                                                                                             
 
 15. See I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (West Supp. 2016); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (as amended in 
2014); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(k)(7) ex. 25–26 (replacing 100 out of 300 windows not a 
capitalizable improvement, but replacing 200 out of 300 windows treated as a restoration of 
the building’s structure and therefore an improvement).  
 16. BRADFORD, supra note 6, at 266–67; McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1272; Schenk, supra 
note 5, at 166. 
 17. In addition to describing categories of tax complexity, scholars have also identified a 
number of sources of tax complexity, including the proliferation of tax expenditures and the 
use of “income” as a tax base. See, e.g., JCT REPORT, supra note 7, at 5; MICHAEL BROSTEK, 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-747T, TAX GAP: COMPLEXITY AND TAXPAYER 
COMPLIANCE 11 (2011); ZELENAK, supra note 11, at 114; Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy 
Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV. 645, 654–69 (2003); Louis Kaplow, How 
Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency of the Income Tax, 49 NAT’L 
TAX J. 135, 138–39 (1996); McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1273–74.  
 18. See Donaldson, supra note 17, at 652; McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1267; Schenk, 
supra note 5, at 123. 
 19. Donaldson, supra note 17; McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1318–22 (discussing pros and 
cons of simplification). 
 20. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE 
DEBATE OVER TAXES 167 (4th ed. 2008); McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1281. 
 21. See, e.g., 1 NINA E. OLSON, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 3 (2012) (“The most serious problem facing taxpayers—and the IRS—is the 
complexity of the Internal Revenue Code . . . .”).  
 22. See, e.g., BROSTEK, supra note 17 (recommending Congress simplify the tax code, 
and IRS and Congress together enhance third-party information reporting and compliance 
checks); OLSON, supra note 21 (urging Congress to simplify Code). See generally Schenk, 
supra note 5 (offering legislative proposals to simplify tax rules). 
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repeal tax expenditures to simplify the code,23 while others have suggested that a 
move to a flat tax or a consumption tax would be the best way to simplify.24 Although 
both sides make compelling arguments, it is not necessary to resolve the debate over 
whether we should implement fundamental changes to our tax base or rate structure 
here. The tax legislative process is subject to gridlock25 and mired in politics, and 
this Article seeks to explore simplification alternatives that would not require 
fundamental changes to our tax code. But before turning to those proposals, the next 
part introduces a new framework for thinking about tax complexity. 
B. A New Framework: Procedural Versus Substantive Complexity 
This Article focuses on the difficulty of the process of paying taxes. Accordingly, 
it draws a distinction between complexity in the substance of the tax rules versus 
complexity in the procedures related to managing our tax affairs. Concededly, these 
two types of complexity may sometimes be inextricably linked to one another, and 
the boundary between them may not always be clear. But the benefit of focusing on 
this distinction is that it offers an additional perspective on tax evasion: While past 
tax scholarship has argued that there is a link between substantive tax complexity 
and evasion, this Article asserts that procedural tax complexity also likely plays an 
important role in tax noncompliance. 
1. Substantive Complexity 
It is clear that some aspects of our tax system cause taxpayers to experience 
confusion and uncertainty. This confusion can result from any of the types of 
complexity described above. Taxpayers may find it difficult to understand the mean-
ing of statutes, regulations, or rulings (rule-based complexity). Or they may have 
trouble understanding how to apply those rules to their own situation (structural 
complexity). And taxpayers may not understand which forms, records, or other steps 
are needed to comply (compliance complexity). The common thread here is that the 
complexity in the tax rules makes it difficult for taxpayers to comprehend those rules. 
I refer to this type of complexity as substantive complexity.  
Substantive complexity encompasses more than just rule-based complexity. The 
“substance” here could be the substance of a tax statute, or it could simply be the 
substance of an instruction to a tax form. Substantive tax complexity refers to any 
complexity that causes taxpayers to not understand what is asked of them, or at the 
very least causes uncertainty. It does not matter what stage of the process the taxpayer 
is in (e.g., reading a statute, applying a rule, or filling out a form). Any of the types 
of complexity traditionally described in the literature could potentially result in 
substantive complexity.  
                                                                                                             
 
 23. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 21, at 3, 15; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 20, at 216–17. 
 24. See, e.g., MICHAEL GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS (2008) (proposing 
a flat VAT for most people); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 20, at 194 (discussing simplicity 
of a single rate on income); id. at 216 (discussing simplicity of a consumption base). 
 25. See Jason S. Oh, The Pivotal Politics of Temporary Legislation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 
1055, 1063–66 (2015). 
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2. Procedural Complexity 
Substantive complexity can be contrasted with “procedural complexity.” 
Procedural complexity refers to any type of complexity that involves burdensome or 
numerous processes or steps. Whereas the key to substantive complexity is confusion 
and uncertainty, the key to procedural complexity is taxpayer burden. A taxpayer 
faces procedural complexity, for example, when she understands the substance of a 
rule allowing her to claim a particular credit but has to undergo a time-consuming, 
multistep process to claim the credit.26 Although procedural complexity is closely 
related to compliance complexity, the two are distinct. The compliance complexity 
described in the literature generally encompasses any form of complexity that is 
related to the recordkeeping and filing obligations of taxpayers. Compliance 
complexity could be substantive (e.g., a taxpayer does not understand the rules 
governing which records she must keep) or procedural (e.g., a taxpayer understands 
the recordkeeping requirements, but they are burdensome and time-consuming).  
3. Evaluating Tax Rules Under the Substantive/Procedural Framework 
Using this framework, we can evaluate the complexity of any aspect of the tax 
system on two dimensions: whether the substantive complexity is high or low and 
whether the procedural complexity is high or low.27 For example, some tax rules are 
high in both substantive and procedural complexity, like the notoriously complicated 
AMT. The substance of the relevant code sections28 is hard to understand without tax 
expertise, and it can also be incredibly difficult for taxpayers to predict whether it 
will apply to them. Even if they know they will be subject to the AMT, many taxpay-
ers likely do not understand, substantively, how or why their tax bill is higher.29 The 
AMT is high in procedural complexity, as well. Calculation of one’s AMT liability 
without the help of software requires filling out a sixty-line form with fourteen pages 
of instructions and multiple worksheets,30 which is a burdensome process even for 
those who are able to fully comprehend the steps. And even taxpayers using tax-
preparation software might be subject to procedural complexity related to the AMT 
because software packages may require certain calculations to be done by hand.  
                                                                                                             
 
 26. Leandra Lederman and Stephen W. Mazza use the term “procedural complexity” in 
Addressing Imperfections in the Tax System: Procedural or Substantive Reform?, 103 MICH. 
L. REV. 1423, 1438–44 (2005) (book review). However, their focus is primarily on the 
complexity of various tax procedure rules, such as those surrounding collection due process 
hearings, and the impact that such complexity has on the IRS’s ability to effectively administer 
the tax laws. Id. 
 27. The “high” versus “low” distinction is a simplification (no pun intended). Whether a 
provision is simple or complex on either dimension would fall onto a spectrum, where some 
provisions are more complex than others. 
 28. I.R.C. §§ 55–59 (West Supp. 2016). 
 29. ZELENAK, supra note 11, at 113–14.  
 30. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF TREAS., FORM 6251, ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM 
TAX—INDIVIDUALS (2016), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f6251.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY8J 
-WS5M]; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF TREAS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 6251 (2016), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i6251.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZRG2-4ELP]. 
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Other tax provisions may be high in substantive complexity but low in procedural 
complexity. Consider, for example, a self-employed taxpayer who owns a building 
related to her business with multiple air conditioning units. Further assume that when 
two of the units break down, she replaces them with new units that are ten percent 
more energy efficient. The rules governing whether she may deduct that expense or 
must capitalize it are substantively complex. Generally, “repairs” are deductible but 
“improvements” are not. In this case, the units had to be replaced because they were 
broken, but they have been replaced with an improved model. The regulations under 
§ 263(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provide a complicated framework of rules for 
determining what constitutes an improvement for this purpose (in this case, the cost 
is deductible),31 making this relatively high in substantive complexity. However, the 
procedural complexity is low. For a taxpayer that is able to determine that the 
replacement cost is a deductible business expense, she may simply report that ex-
pense in full on line 21 (“Repairs and maintenance”) of Schedule C.32  
Other rules may be high in procedural complexity but low in substantive 
complexity. Consider, for example, a taxpayer who owns a taxable investment ac-
count consisting of stocks and bonds that is managed by a financial institution. As-
sume that, during the tax year, the account generated capital gains and losses from 
sales of stocks. The financial institution will issue the taxpayer an information state-
ment33 (Form 1099-B) at year-end to show the gain and loss from those sales. To 
report the gain or loss, the taxpayer must fill out Form 8949. Rather than simply 
reporting net amounts of long-term or short-term capital gain or loss, the taxpayer 
must enter the following information for each transaction:34 
• Description of property sold 
• Date acquired 
• Date sold 
• Cost basis (generally the purchase price) 
• Sale proceeds 
• Net gain or loss 
For taxpayers with a high volume of sales transactions, this can be a tedious and 
time-consuming process, and the use of tax-preparation software may not ease the 
burden. However, the process itself is fairly straightforward and intellectually sim-
ple. And the substance of the applicable legal rules—that the net gain or loss (gener-
ally the difference between the purchase price and the sale price) must be reported 
for tax purposes35—is also relatively simple. The result is low substantive complexity 
with relatively high procedural complexity. 
                                                                                                             
 
 31. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(i)(6) ex. 20 (as amended in 2014).  
 32. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF TREAS., SCH. C (FORM 1040), PROFIT OR LOSS 
FROM BUSINESS 1 (2016), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040sc.pdf [https://perma.cc/TE52 
-47MP]. 
 33. See I.R.C. § 6045(a) (West Supp. 2016). 
 34. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF TREAS., FORM 8949 (2016), http://www.irs.gov 
/pub/irs-pdf/f8949.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q8V-JXRD]. 
 35. See generally I.R.C. §§ 1001(a)–(b), 1012 (West 2011 & Supp. 2016). The taxpayer’s 
basis in the property sold may be subject to other adjustments not relevant for purposes of this 
example. See I.R.C. § 1011(a) (2012). 
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 Finally, some rules are low in both substantive and procedural complexity. An 
example is reporting wage income, which is reported to taxpayers on Form W-2. The 
substance of these rules is simple. Your wages are taxable income,36 and they must 
be reported on line seven of Form 1040 (“Wages, salaries, tips, etc.”). The procedure 
is also simple. The taxpayer must simply enter the amount of wages reported on Form 
W-2 on her tax return and attach the W-237 or enter her W-2 information into a soft-
ware program. 
The relationship between substantive and procedural complexity is summarized 
with examples in the table below: 
 High Procedural Complexity Low Procedural Complexity 
High 
Substantive 
Complexity 
Calculating and Reporting AMT 
Reporting a Single Deductible 
“Repair” Expense 
Low 
Substantive 
Complexity 
Reporting Sales of Investments 
(Broker Transactions) 
Reporting Wage Income 
 
The policy proposals in the latter half of this Article focus on ways to reduce 
procedural complexity in an effort to improve tax compliance. The ripest fruit here 
is rules that are high in procedural complexity and low in substantive complexity. 
Some procedurally complex rules directly correlate to substantive complexity in the 
underlying statute, and it may be hard to reduce one without the other. For example, 
the complicated rules under the AMT require many calculations that are bound to be 
burdensome. Eliminating or simplifying the AMT itself (reducing substantive 
complexity) seems to be the more natural fix. But burdensome reporting rules relat-
ing to relatively simple substantive concepts (e.g., broker transactions) may be better 
targets for reforming the process under which we pay taxes. 
Reducing procedural complexity in the tax system has the potential to produce 
enormous social gains because it would cut down on the time and resources that 
taxpayers spend complying with the tax laws. But an important second-order effect 
of this reduction in taxpayer effort is its potential impact on taxpayer compliance. 
Procedurally complex rules are mentally exhausting to deal with, and some taxpayers 
may fail to comply because they think doing so is too much work. The next section 
more fully explores the relationship between complexity and tax compliance.  
C. Impact of Complexity on Taxpayer Compliance 
A number of commentators have focused on the negative impact that tax 
complexity may have on voluntary tax compliance; however, this literature is gener-
ally focused on substantive complexity.38 Scholars’ arguments generally offer three 
                                                                                                             
 
 36. See I.R.C. § 61 (2012). 
 37. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF TREAS., FORM 1040, U.S. INDIVIDUAL TAX 
RETURN (2016) [hereinafter FORM 1040]. 
 38. One exception is MARK PHILLIPS & ALAN PLUMLEY, EFFORT AND COMPLIANCE AS 
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explanations for why complexity causes lower compliance: unintentional errors; in-
creased opportunities for avoidance or evasion; and evasion due to resentment or 
perceived unfairness.  
1. Noncompliance Due to Substantive Complexity 
First, a number of commentators have argued that complexity in the tax law will 
inevitably cause taxpayers to make mistakes.39 If taxpayers don’t understand the 
rules that govern their tax liability, it is possible they will accidentally underreport 
that liability. However, the net effect here is unclear, as taxpayers may unintention-
ally overreport their tax liability, as well. Additionally, some taxpayers may take 
intentionally conservative tax positions (again, potentially overreporting) in the case 
of uncertainty because they fear the repercussions if they underreport.40  
Second, commentators have argued that the uncertainty created by complex laws 
creates opportunities for and may encourage intentional tax evasion.41 Complex laws 
may be more difficult for the IRS to enforce and may consume more government 
resources. Thus, taxpayers may be more inclined to play the “audit lottery” and as-
sume that they are unlikely to get caught cheating.42 Complicated rules may also lead 
taxpayers to believe they will have more success defending their position if they are 
caught underreporting because they can claim (whether honestly or not) to not under-
stand the relevant rules. Other taxpayers may stop short of outright evasion but take 
aggressive tax positions that are made possible by rules subject to multiple 
interpretations.  
Third, some have argued that complexity lowers taxpayer morale and fosters 
cynicism.43 Under this view, taxpayers may be less likely to comply with their tax 
obligations because they resent the complexity of the tax laws.44 Or taxpayers may 
                                                                                                             
 
ENDOGENOUS TAXPAYER DECISIONS (2014), https://www.ntanet.org/wp-content/uploads 
/proceedings/2014/141-phillips-plumley-effort-compliance-endogenous-taxpayer-decisions.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YM6A-HCFE]. See also Frank H. Pedersen, Advancing the Study of Tax 
Complexity with the Usability Model, 12 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 282, 287 (2012) (arguing that 
our understanding of tax complexity should include “taxpayers’ empirical experiences in 
handling their tax affairs”). 
 39. JCT REPORT, supra note 7, at 102; BROSTEK, supra note 17, at 8; OLSON, supra note 
21, at 3; Wojciech Kopczuk, Tax Simplification and Tax Compliance: An Economic Perspec-
tive, in BRIDGING THE TAX GAP 111, 124–25 (Max B. Sawicky ed., 2005). Taxpayers who 
make unintentional mistakes are also less likely to be deterred by tax penalties, which further 
undermines the IRS’s enforcement efforts. Id. at 125. 
 40. JCT REPORT, supra note 7, at 102. 
 41. See e.g., BROSTEK, supra note 17, at 8, 13–14; OLSON, supra note 21, at 3. 
 42. JCT REPORT, supra note 7, at 102; McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1289–90. The audit 
lottery is a good bet for some taxpayers (those whose income is not reported by third parties), 
as the overall audit rate for individuals is currently less than one percent. See INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2015 ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE RESULTS 2 (2015), https:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/fy2015enforcementandserviceresults2015.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/T6T3-5TEM] (individual audit rate for 2015 was 0.84%). 
 43. JCT REPORT, supra note 7, at 109; OLSON, supra note 21, at 3; McCaffery, supra note 
6, at 1311–12. 
 44. See McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1290. 
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view a complicated tax system as unfairly favoring some taxpayers over others, 
which may lead to intentional noncompliance.45 While there are some studies 
supporting the assertion that taxpayers think the tax rules are complicated and diffi-
cult to apply,46 some commentators have pointed out that there is no empirical proof 
that low morale resulting from the complexity of the tax laws actually drives people 
to intentionally evade their tax liability.47 Indeed, data on whether taxpayers view the 
complexity of the tax code as a major problem or as a barrier to compliance is 
mixed.48 Scholars have pointed to the fact that overall compliance rates have not 
changed over time as tax rules have become more complicated, indicating that substan-
tive complexity does not affect voluntary compliance in any significant way.49 
2. Noncompliance Due to Procedural Complexity 
As discussed above, scholars have argued that substantive complexity may lead 
to accidental errors by honest taxpayers or intentional noncompliance by dishonest 
taxpayers. But there is another reason people might fail to report and pay the tax they 
owe—something beyond pure accident but far less nefarious than intentional 
exploitation of the system or outright refusal to pay due to resentment. Some taxpay-
ers simply may be too lazy to comply. They may want to be honest in theory. That 
is, they don’t have an emotional justification to purposefully withhold tax and they 
don’t otherwise plan to cheat because they know they won’t get caught. Rather, this 
Article hypothesizes that there is some not-insignificant group of taxpayers who 
would report and pay what they owe if the process for doing so required less effort. 
Why would effort impact the decision to cheat? As will be discussed in the next 
Part, empirical evidence has shown that when we deplete our mental resources 
through an abundance of information, choices, or other activities requiring mental 
effort, our behavior changes. Mental exhaustion has been linked to dishonesty, lack 
of self-control, and passivity, all of which may lead to noncompliance with the tax 
laws. This theory will be developed more fully in Part III.  
                                                                                                             
 
 45. JCT REPORT, supra note 7, at 109. But see Adam Forest & Steven M. Sheffrin, 
Complexity and Compliance: An Empirical Investigation, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 75 (2002) (finding 
in survey data  a link between perceived unfairness and lower compliance but no link between 
perceived complexity of the tax system and perceived unfairness). 
 46. See, e.g., Tom Beers, Eric LoPresti & Eric San Juan, Factors Influencing Voluntary 
Compliance by Sole Proprietors: Preliminary Survey Results (reporting that fifty-six percent 
of sole proprietors surveyed agreed that “the tax rules are so complicated [that] it is very diffi-
cult to get a tax return exactly right”), in TAX ADMINISTRATION AT THE CENTENNIAL: AN IRS-
TPC RESEARCH CONFERENCE 65, 81 (Alan Plumley, ed. 2013). 
 47. See, e.g., Donaldson, supra note 17, at 694. 
 48. See, e.g., TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE, VOLUME 1: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 128 
(Jeffrey A. Roth, John T. Scholz & Ann Dryden Witte eds., 1989) (“[R]espondents in several 
surveys did not list complexity among the major problems with the tax system.” (citation 
omitted)); Beers et al., supra note 46, at 81 (finding that most respondents agreed that the rules 
about what to report as income are clear and that their recordkeeping system made it easy to 
compute their income); Valerie C. Milliron, A Behavioral Study of the Meaning and Influence 
of Tax Complexity, 23 J. ACCT. RES. 794, 795 (1985). 
 49. Donaldson, supra note 17, at 694. 
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Procedural complexity may contribute to lower tax compliance in other ways, as 
well. Like substantive complexity, procedural complexity may lead to unintentional 
errors that ultimately reduce revenue. Further, it’s likely that procedural complexity 
reduces taxpayer morale, which could result in lower overall compliance. And be-
cause the procedural complexity of the tax system is harder to avoid or ignore, it 
might be a more significant source of taxpayer resentment than substantive complex-
ity. This is consistent with empirical data showing that more than half of taxpayers 
(55%) rank paperwork and hassle among the top reasons they dislike doing their 
taxes, as compared to not liking how the government uses their money (12%) or 
thinking they pay too much tax (5%).50 
II. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: HOW COMPLEXITY IMPACTS BEHAVIOR 
Procedural complexity in our tax system means that managing one’s tax affairs is 
often burdensome and time-consuming even when the rules are relatively straight-
forward. This has important implications for tax compliance because studies show 
that mental exhaustion leads to certain behavioral tendencies, such as dishonesty or 
lack of self-control. This part discusses the empirical research on mental fatigue and 
our natural tendency to avoid mental effort.  
A. Inherent Laziness and Mental Depletion 
The human brain is fundamentally lazy; we don’t like having to think too hard. 
Mental laziness, as described by the prominent psychologist Daniel Kahneman, “is 
built deep into our nature.”51 From an evolutionary perspective, this makes sense. 
Thinking hard causes us to consume glucose, which would have required our ances-
tors to search for food and expose themselves to predators.52 Preserving our cognitive 
resources was simply another form of self-preservation.  
A number of psychologists and economists have discussed the implications of our 
mental laziness on human behavior. One intuitive phenomenon is the “law of least 
mental effort,” which says that if there are multiple ways of achieving a goal, we 
tend to choose the least demanding course of action.53 When dealing with cognitive 
effort, this may result in people relying on intuitions or mental heuristics54 instead of 
                                                                                                             
 
 50. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., A THIRD OF AMERICANS SAY THEY LIKE DOING THEIR 
INCOME TAXES 7 (2013), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/04-11-13%20Taxes 
%20Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/93CG-32LF]. The top reasons were “Taxes are 
complicated/too much paperwork/afraid of mistakes/not good with numbers” (31%) and 
“Inconvenient/hassle/time consuming” (24%). Id. at 7. Although the study indicates taxpayers 
have negative attitudes about procedural complexity, further study is needed to determine how 
these attitudes impact voluntary compliance. 
 51. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 35 (2011); see also SUSAN M. 
WEINSCHENK, HOW TO GET PEOPLE TO DO STUFF 125 (2013).  
 52. WEINSCHENK, supra note 51, at 125–26. 
 53. See e.g., Wouter Kool, Joseph T. McGuire, Zev B. Rosen & Matthew M. Botvinick, 
Decision Making and the Avoidance of Cognitive Demand, 139 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 
665, 666 (2010), accord KAHNEMAN, supra note 51, at 35.  
 54. See generally Anuj K. Shah & Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Heuristics Made Easy: An 
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information gathering or calculations when the latter would require more effort.  
Psychologists have also theorized that we have a pool of internal resources that 
we draw upon to perform various cognitive tasks, and that pool is limited and subject 
to depletion.55 We use these mental resources to do things like override our impulses, 
make choices between alternatives, and initiate actions (as opposed to being pas-
sive).56 The resource “resembles an energy or strength,” such that when we dip into 
it in order to perform some cognitive task, we use up the reserves and become fa-
tigued.57 Once we have exhausted our mental resources we are in a state of depletion, 
which has a number of behavioral implications. For example, studies have shown 
mental depletion can lead to overspending and impulsive purchasing, deviating from 
one’s diet, aggressive behavior, performing poorly on cognitive tasks,58 and giving 
up sooner on frustrating tasks.59 Some of the relevant research on the effects of men-
tal depletion is discussed in more detail below.  
Like our inherent laziness, mental depletion also appears to be biological. 
Research has shown that our bodies consume glucose when we expend mental energy 
similar to the way we consume glucose stored in our muscles when we exercise.60 
Thus, when people are mentally fatigued, they have been found to experience a drop 
in blood glucose levels.61  
                                                                                                             
 
Effort-Reduction Framework, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 207 (2008). 
 55. Roy F. Baumeister, Mark Muraven, and Dianne M. Tice, Ego Depletion: A Resource 
Model of Volition, Self-Regulation, and Controlled Processing, 18 SOC. COGNITION 130, 130–
31 (2000). 
 56. Id. at 131. 
 57. Id. Psychologists have termed this phenomenon “ego depletion.” Id. 
 58. KAHNEMAN, supra note 51, at 42.  
 59. For example, in one study, subjects were made to resist temptation by sitting at a table 
with cookies and radishes and being told to only eat the radishes. Other subjects were told to 
eat the cookies. Both groups were then asked to complete a set of puzzles that (unbeknownst 
to the subjects) were unsolvable. The act of resisting temptation to eat the cookies appeared to 
deplete the subjects who were made to eat radishes. Those subjects gave up on the problem-
solving task sooner, whereas the subjects who ate cookies persisted significantly longer. Roy 
F. Baumeister, Ellen Bratslavsky, Mark Muraven & Dianne M. Tice, Ego Depletion: Is the 
Active Self a Limited Resource?, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1252, 1253–56 (1998). 
Having to choose among alternatives also appears to deplete mental energy. Subjects in a 
similar study who had to make an informed choice before performing a task showed less 
persistence on the unsolvable puzzles task compared to subjects who were assigned a task and 
not told to choose among alternatives. Id. at 1256-58. 
 60. KAHNEMAN, supra note 51, at 43; Matthew T. Gailliot & Roy F. Baumeister, The 
Physiology of Willpower: Linking Blood Glucose to Self-Control, 11 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. REV. 303, 304, 306 (2007). “[E]ffortful, controlled, or executive processes” require 
more glucose than “less effortful, or automatic” mental activities. Id. at 306. 
 61. See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 51, at 43; Gailliot & Baumeister, supra note 60, at 
308–309. For example, subjects who watched a video that required them to “control their 
attention” by ignoring certain stimuli that flashed across the screen experienced a drop in blood 
glucose after watching the video. Id. at 308. Blood glucose levels did not change for subjects 
who watched the video without being asked to ignore the stimuli. Id. Interestingly, research 
has also shown that mental depletion can be at least partly undone by ingesting glucose. Rest 
and sleep have also been found to restore our mental resources after depletion. KAHNEMAN, 
supra note 51, at 43; Gailliot & Baumeister, supra note 60, at 309, 318.  
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B. The Effect of Mental Depletion on Behavior 
1. Passivity 
One effect of mental depletion is that it tends to make people behave more 
passively.62 For example, a study of Israeli judges found that they were significantly 
more likely to depart from the status quo by granting parole at the beginning of the 
day and right after food breaks.63 On the other hand, they adhered to the status quo 
and denied parole significantly more after they had spent several hours hearing re-
quests. The authors of the study concluded that the decision making of the judges 
depleted their mental energy throughout the day, resulting in a clear decline in their 
willingness to grant parole.64 Similarly, a field study of car consumers revealed that 
they are more willing to accept manufacturer default choices if those choices are 
presented to them later in a series of decisions versus earlier.65 
2. Lower Self-Control 
Studies also indicate that mental depletion makes it harder for us to exercise self-
control.66 The theory here is that exercising self-control requires us to override our 
desires to some extent, by substituting behaviors we want for different (presumably 
better) behaviors.67 Like many other cognitive tasks, this requires mental energy on 
our part.68 If our reserves of mental energy have been depleted by some other 
                                                                                                             
 
 62. Baumeister et al., supra note 55, at 139. 
 63. Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous Factors in Judi-
cial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.  6889, 6890–6892  (2011). 
 64. In the morning and right after food breaks, the judges granted approximately sixty-
five percent of requests. That number dropped to nearly zero towards the end of a block of 
time during which requests were heard. Id. 
 65. Jonathan Levav, Mark Heitmann, Andreas Herrmann & Sheen S. Iyengar, Order in 
Product Customization Decisions: Evidence from Field Experiments, 118 J. POL. ECON. 274, 
278 (2010). 
 66. However, it should be noted that, although a number of studies have found that self-
control is influenced by mental depletion, a recent replication project failed to find any 
meaningful effect on self-control. That project did not attempt to replicate studies that showed 
an effect on honesty or passivity. Martin S. Hagger & Nikos L.D. Chatzisarantis, A Multilab 
Preregistered Replication of the Ego-Depletion Effect, 11 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 546 
(2016). 
 67. See Kathleen D. Vohs, Roy F. Baumeister, Brandon J. Schmeichel, Jean M. Twenge, 
Noelle M. Nelson & Dianne M. Tice, Making Choices Impairs Subsequent Self-Control: A 
Limited-Resource Account of Decision Making, Self-Regulation, and Active Initiative, 94 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 883, 884 (2008); see also Francesca Gino, Maurice E. 
Schweitzer, Nicole L. Mead & Dan Ariely, Unable To Resist Temptation: How Self-Control 
Depletion Promotes Unethical Behavior, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 191, 192 (2011) (“Self-control is ‘the ability to override or change one’s inner 
response, as well as to interrupt undesired behavioral tendencies (such as impulses) and refrain 
from acting on them.’” (citation omitted)). 
 68. See Gino et al., supra note 67, at 192. 
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cognitive task, we are less likely to demonstrate self-control.69 
In one series of experiments, researchers depleted subjects by requiring them to 
make choices among things like consumer products or college courses from a course 
catalogue (depletion condition).70 Other subjects were presented with information 
but not asked to make choices (no depletion condition). Both groups were then ex-
posed to a scenario that tested self-control. For example, one experiment examined 
how much subjects would procrastinate during time they were given to study for a 
math test.71 The subjects were given a packet of practice problems but were also 
allowed to read magazines or play a video game during the preparation time.72 The 
subjects who had been mentally depleted before the test preparation spent less time 
studying and more time reading magazines and playing games, indicative of lower 
self-control.73 Depleted subjects in other studies similarly tolerated pain less (meas-
ured by time spent immersing hands in cold water)74 and persisted for less time on 
both solvable and unsolvable puzzles.75 
3. Dishonesty 
Finally,76 researchers have found that people who have been mentally depleted 
tend to be less honest and are more likely to cheat. For example, in one study, partici-
pants were asked to write a short essay without using words that contained the letters 
A or N (depletion condition) while another group was asked not to use words that 
contained X or Z (no-depletion condition).77 Afterwards, both groups were given a 
problem-solving task for which they would be paid for each correct answer.78 The 
subjects had the opportunity to cheat because they graded their own work, self-
reported the number of problems that they correctly solved, and paid themselves.79 
As predicted, the depleted participants claimed to have solved significantly more 
                                                                                                             
 
 69. See id. 
 70. See Vohs et al., supra note 67, at 885, 887. The choices varied by study. 
 71. Id. at 887. The subjects were told the math test was a predictor of successful life outcomes. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 888. 
 74. Id. at 887. 
 75. Id. at 890. 
 76. This discussion highlights some behavioral implications of mental depletion but is by 
no means exhaustive. There are dozens of studies showing other effects. For an overview of 
the literature, see Baumeister et al., supra note 55. 
 77. Nicole L. Mead, Roy F. Baumeister, Francesca Gino, Maurice E. Schweitzer & Dan 
Ariely, Too Tired To Tell the Truth: Self-Control Resource Depletion and Dishonesty, 45 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 594, 594–595 (2009). Because significantly fewer words con-
tain X and Z, the latter task was not mentally taxing.  
 78. Id. at 594. 
 79. The researchers gauged dishonesty in this experiment by requiring another group of 
subjects to have their answers checked by an experimenter. The higher average number of 
problems claimed to have been solved by those with an opportunity to cheat (the self-scorers) 
compared to those who had their answers checked was assumed to be the result of dishonesty. 
Nondepleted subjects who self-scored reported twenty-five percent more correct answers than 
those who had their answers checked, while depleted subjects who self-scored reported 104% 
more correct answers than those who had their answers checked. Id. 
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problems than the nondepleted participants, indicating that the former group cheated 
more. Interestingly, however, depletion did not appear to alter actual performance on 
the problem-solving task.80 
A similar experiment depleted participants by instructing them to not look at 
words flashing across the screen during a video, while the nondepleted participants 
were given no instructions.81 Both groups were then asked to solve puzzles for finan-
cial compensation and self-report their scores.82 Again, the depleted participants 
were more likely to overstate their performance than their nondepleted counterparts, 
with thirty-four percent cheating in the depleted condition compared to 13.7% in the 
nondepleted condition.83 Thus, the authors concluded, “when self-regulatory re-
sources are depleted by prior exertion of self-control, unethical behavior increases.”84 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR TAX COMPLIANCE  
The studies discussed above have important implications for tax compliance. The 
procedural complexity of our tax system may lead to mental depletion, which in turn 
can impact taxpayer behavior. Understanding the potential connection between 
procedural complexity and taxpayer behavior provides additional insight into how to 
improve tax compliance. By making the process of taxpaying less complicated, pol-
icy makers may be able to reduce tax evasion. 
A. Mental Depletion in Taxpayers 
The law of least effort says that we’d prefer to do less work whenever possible, 
including mental work. But complying with our various tax obligations can take an 
extraordinary amount of mental effort, particularly for certain types of taxpayers like 
sole proprietors, who must track numerous items of income and expense. Research 
also indicates that our mental reserves are a limited resource that can be depleted by 
tasks that require cognitive effort. The type of task itself does not appear to be as 
important as the amount of effort expended. Making choices among various prod-
ucts, exercising self-control by not looking at words flashing across a screen, writing 
text without using certain letters, and making parole decisions all have been shown 
to lead to mental depletion. What these various tasks have in common is that they all 
require sustained mental focus, and that focus is exhausting. 
The procedural complexity of our tax laws is similarly exhausting. The number 
of forms and related documents potentially required for tax return preparation is evi-
dence of this. For example, for 2016, Form 1040 was seventy-nine lines long with 
                                                                                                             
 
 80. This was verified by comparing the results among depleted and nondepleted subjects 
who had their answers checked by an experimenter. Id. 
 81. Gino et al., supra note 67, at 194. 
 82. In this study, the researchers tracked actual performance on a computer and with a 
collection slip that indicated the participants’ lab ID. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 195. Another study found that subjects cheated more in the afternoon and even-
ing as compared to the morning, suggesting that the subjects’ daily activities depleted their 
mental energy. Maryam Kouchaki & Isaac H. Smith, The Morning Morality Effect: The Influ-
ence of Time of Day on Unethical Behavior, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 95 (2014). 
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nearly 100 pages of instructions.85 Besides Form 1040, there are over 600 other tax 
forms and schedules and over 150 worksheets.86 Taxpayers’ obligations extend be-
yond year-end tax filing, as well. There are various recordkeeping requirements, and 
some taxpayers must estimate and pay taxes each quarter.87 
B. Mental Depletion May Lead to Lower Tax Compliance 
The behaviors observed in empirical studies of mental depletion are relevant to 
tax compliance in several ways. First, mental depletion is linked to passivity. 
Individuals who have exhausted their mental resources tend to avoid active choices 
and are prone to stick with defaults.88 Passivity is particularly relevant to our income 
tax system in the United States because we have a self-reporting system.89 That is, 
each individual must make a return at year-end on which she voluntarily reports her 
income.90 Under such a system, the status quo is to do nothing, or not report. Report-
ing income, particularly income that is not subject to tax withholding, is like the 
Israeli judges granting parole. It’s active versus passive and a departure from the 
default. The effect of mental depletion on passivity potentially has enormous 
implications for tax compliance. If tax complexity is depleting taxpayers’ limited 
mental resources and causing them to behave more passively, they could fail to act 
in important ways. For example, this could mean failing to report a household em-
ployee, failing to report cash income that hasn’t been reported to the IRS by third 
parties, or failing to pay use taxes on a large purchase. 91  
In addition to passivity, mental depletion has also been linked to unethical 
behavior, like lying for monetary gain.92 Intentionally misreporting the number of 
problems correctly solved in order to collect a bigger payout is analogous to 
                                                                                                             
 
 85. FORM 1040, supra note 37; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF TREAS., 1040 
INSTRUCTIONS (2016), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040gi.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KEK-DBNA]. 
 86. JCT Report, supra note 7, at 4. Of course, all of those forms will not be relevant for 
one particular taxpayer. 
 87. See I.R.C. § 6654(a) (2012). 
 88. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 89. Passivity would be less troubling in the context of taxes that do not require self-
reporting, such as a retail sales tax that is automatically collected upon payment. 
 90. Although many taxpayers will have already satisfied their tax obligations through 
withholding and will have their income reported to the IRS by third parties, not all income is 
subject to these rules. For example, income earned by self-employed individuals generally is 
not subject to third-party reporting. 
 91. In a recent empirical study, researchers observed passivity in subjects who were sub-
ject to complex tax rules. Johannes Abeler & Simon Jäger, Complex Tax Incentives, 7 AM. 
ECON. J. 1 (2015). In the study, subjects had to attempt to maximize their compensation in a 
system of taxes and subsidies by adjusting their output from a simple task each time a new tax 
rule was introduced. Id. at 6–7. Unsurprisingly, those subject to fewer rules (the simple sys-
tem) were able to better optimize their compensation than those subject to more rules (the 
complex system). Id. at 12. However, what’s particularly interesting is that those in the com-
plex system didn’t just make the wrong decisions; they were also much more likely to fail to 
act altogether to adjust their output when a new tax rule was introduced, indicating a status 
quo bias. Id. at 14.   
 92. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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intentionally underreporting income in order to pay less tax (or receive a bigger tax 
refund). The latter is also a form of lying for monetary gain. To the extent that mental 
depletion makes it harder for people to resist the temptation to cheat, individuals 
faced with tax complexity may be more likely to underreport their income. 
Finally, mental depletion has been linked to lower self-control more broadly. For 
example, people are less likely to stick to their diet or refrain from smoking if they 
have been mentally depleted.93 Again, the idea appears to be that individuals lose 
their willpower to substitute desired behavior for less desirable behavior when their 
mental reserves are low. If tax complexity minimizes taxpayers’ willpower, they may 
find themselves not complying despite their best intentions. In other words, taxpayers 
may have positive attitudes about paying what they owe, and consider themselves to 
be fundamentally honest people, but unable to motivate themselves to expend the 
mental effort to comply.94 
C. Simpler Taxpaying Procedures Should Foster Better Tax Compliance 
Individuals tend to have more willpower, behave more honestly, and are more 
willing to make active decisions when they are not mentally depleted. Thus, if we 
want to encourage people to comply with their tax obligations—to not avoid them or 
ignore them—we should make it easier to comply. This means not just simplifying 
the substance of the tax code, as many have suggested. We should also make the 
process easier on taxpayers. Reducing procedural complexity should reduce the 
cognitive strain that taxpayers undoubtedly experience in their interactions with the 
tax system. Less cognitive effort should, in turn, lead to better taxpaying behavior.  
Concededly, the application of mental depletion research to taxpayer behavior is 
uncertain and should be the subject of further study. But mental depletion is just one 
potential mechanism to explain the potential link between procedural complexity and 
tax compliance. Even apart from mental fatigue, taxpayers may evade taxes because 
they make a rational decision that the costs of their compliance obligations are too 
high when weighed against the benefits. For example, one IRS study of audit data 
found that taxpayers generally reported more income when compliance costs were 
lower, even when the IRS lacked significant information about that income.95 The 
authors of the study further concluded that taxpayers tend to err on the side of under 
reporting versus over reporting when they perceive compliance costs are high, stating 
“taxpayers are more likely to choose inaccuracy over exerting the effort to be 
accurate when the ‘easy-to-report’ amount is relatively lower than the expected true 
amount.”96 
Further, while the empirical studies discussed above support the notion that 
procedural complexity impacts tax compliance, so do our commonsense intuitions. 
If the government wants taxpayers to voluntarily report and pay tax on income that 
                                                                                                             
 
 93. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 94. Anecdotally, several friends and acquaintances have told me, “I would pay [whatever 
tax is owed] if they just made it easier.” This has come up most often with respect to taxes on 
household employees, like babysitters. 
 95. PHILIPS & PLUMLEY, supra note 38, at 32. 
 96. Id. at 35. 
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it doesn’t already know about, shouldn’t it make things as easy as possible on the 
taxpayers that it wants to encourage?  
To be sure, some individuals would evade their tax obligations regardless of how 
simple it was to comply, particularly those who cheat because the likelihood of detec-
tion is low. We can think of these taxpayers as Determined Cheaters. Determined 
Cheaters will generally evade as much as they can without getting caught.97 Or, a 
Determined Cheater may have such a strong emotional aversion to the tax system 
that he will always cheat to some extent out of principal, perhaps because he thinks 
taxes are inherently unfair. On the other end of the spectrum are the Honest Taxpay-
ers, those who will report all of their income accurately under all circumstances, even 
when the effort required is significant and the odds of detection for underreporting 
are very low. Procedural simplification is unlikely to impact compliance among ei-
ther Determined Cheaters or Honest Taxpayers.  
However, the proposals in this Article are aimed at a third group of taxpayers in 
the middle of the spectrum, who I call the Taxpayers On The Fence. Taxpayers On 
The Fence may cheat or not cheat depending on the circumstances,98 such as the 
effort required to comply. A Taxpayer On The Fence might report cash income on 
his tax return, even if it wasn’t reported on a Form 1099, as long as he has a record 
of the income and the process for reporting it is relatively simple. But he might not 
pay employment taxes on a household employee if he decides the process entails too 
many steps and requires too much effort.99  
Unfortunately, IRS data indicates that less than half of individuals are Honest 
Taxpayers.100 As for Determined Cheaters, improving tax compliance among this 
group would entail significantly raising tax penalties and/or the audit rate, both of 
which would be costly and politically infeasible.101 But policy makers should not 
overlook Taxpayers On The Fence, those taxpayers for whom compliance rates can 
be improved with less costly policies aimed at nudging102 them in the right direction. 
                                                                                                             
 
 97. In other words, a Determined Cheater won’t pay tax owed unless the perceived pen-
alty for evasion outweighs the perceived benefit, something that is highly unlikely for taxpay-
ers who are not subject to any third-party information reporting (e.g., a sole proprietor). 
 98. For this purpose, I am assuming that the level of detection and the penalty for evasion 
are constant and therefore are not potential circumstances that would push a Taxpayer On The 
Fence in one direction or the other. 
 99. The “nanny tax” is discussed further below in Part IV. 
 100. Although overall compliance rates are much higher than fifty percent, when looking 
at income that is not subject to any third-party information reporting or withholding, only 
forty-four percent is reported accurately. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 2. Further, 
an estimated sixty-one percent of sole proprietors earning such income underreport their tax 
liability. JAMES R. WHITE, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-1014, TAX GAP: A 
STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE GAP SHOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING SOLE 
PROPRIETOR NONCOMPLIANCE 3 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/265399.pdf  [https:// 
perma.cc/RVX6-CB2Z] (based on tax gap data for 2001). However, wage earners, whose 
income is withheld and reported on a Form W-2, have very little opportunity to cheat, and it’s 
possible that a greater proportion of them would still be Honest Taxpayers if they did have the 
opportunity. 
 101. See Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Presumptive Collection: A Prospect Theory Ap-
proach to Increasing Small Business Tax Compliance, 67 TAX L. REV. 111, 124 (2013). 
 102. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
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Procedural simplification is a promising means of improving tax compliance among 
this group.103  
There are other upsides to procedural simplification that should not be 
overlooked, the biggest of which is the potential efficiency gain. As scholars have 
noted, the hours spent by taxpayers (and their advisors) complying with tax-filing 
and recordkeeping obligations amounts to deadweight loss, and policies that reduce 
this time should produce social gains.104 This potential cost reduction itself makes 
procedural simplification a worthy goal. However, the potential increase in voluntary 
compliance is an additional component of the cost-benefit analysis. Encouraging 
individuals to report more honestly by simplifying the process should result in 
increased tax revenues, which is an additional benefit beyond reducing deadweight 
loss. Moreover, enhancing compliance in this manner may have positive spillover 
effects. Reduced time and effort may engender more positive feelings about the 
government and/or paying taxes, which may further promote voluntary compliance 
among Taxpayers On The Fence.105  
Of course, substantive tax complexity could also contribute to mental depletion, 
which could in turn cause lower tax compliance among Taxpayers On The Fence. A 
taxpayer struggling to understand a complicated tax rule will expend her limited 
mental resources and may become depleted. Or she may perceive that the cost of 
trying to understand the rule is too high and decide to underreport. But there are 
several reasons that this Article focuses on reducing procedural complexity.  
First, many taxpayers can and presumably do avoid the substantive complexity of 
the tax code. They may not even attempt to understand the underlying rules or 
quickly give up if a substantive rule isn’t clear to them and seek advice. Procedural 
complexity, on the other hand, is unavoidable to some extent. Even taxpayers who 
take a minimal role in complying with their tax obligations—those who use a return 
preparer for example—are forced to have some interaction with the tax system. At 
the very least they may have to fill out tax forms for their employer, maintain records 
during the year, collect tax forms that are mailed to them at the end of the year, and 
correspond with their tax preparer about their tax situation. All of these tasks involve 
some degree of procedural complexity. Further, while substantive simplification has 
its own merits, procedural simplification is a more attainable goal. Rather than re-
writing the tax code, policy makers can make significant headway towards proce-
dural simplification through smaller measures like redesigning tax forms or the IRS 
website, as discussed in the next Part.  
IV. TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
This part discusses some specific tax policy proposals aimed at increasing tax 
                                                                                                             
 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (Penguin Books 2009) (2008) (coining the term “nudge” 
to refer to behavioral interventions). 
 103. Empirical studies support the notion that some taxpayers are influenced by behavioral 
nudges, as discussed below in Part IV.D. 
 104. See, e.g., SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 20, at 160–63. 
 105. Leandra Lederman has described a similar effect with respect to IRS enforcement, 
which she argues “not only produces direct revenue, but also increases revenue from ‘volun-
tary’ compliance.” Lederman, supra note 3, at 1513. 
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compliance by making the process of taxpaying easier. The private sector and other 
areas of government have already caught on to this concept, and the idea of making 
products and processes more user-friendly has become increasingly popular. Accord-
ingly, this part begins by examining examples from industries such as marketing and 
website design, as well as other areas of government regulation, before turning to tax 
policy.  
A. Lessons from the Private Sector 
1. Product Marketing  
Marketing professionals have long understood that selling more products means 
understanding the psyche of their customers. One important finding by marketing 
researchers is that customers are overwhelmed in the face of too much information 
or too many choices and are, therefore, less likely to purchase a product. For exam-
ple, customers at a supermarket were far more likely to purchase jam from a table 
with six options (thirty percent of customers purchased jam) as compared to a table 
with twenty-four options (only three percent purchased).106  
One comprehensive study of over 7000 consumers examined what makes 
customers “sticky,” that is, more likely to follow through on a purchase, make repeat 
purchases, and recommend a product to others.107 The results showed that “[t]he sin-
gle biggest driver of stickiness, by far, was ‘decision simplicity’—the ease with 
which consumers can gather trustworthy information about a product and confidently 
and efficiently weigh their purchase options. What consumers want from markets is, 
simply, simplicity.”108 
So how have marketing professionals incorporated these findings into product 
design? One important lesson is that companies should present consumers with the 
minimal amount of information they need to make a purchase decision.109 This might 
entail, for example, listing a few key features of products on signs in a store but 
omitting specifications that are less important to consumers. Savvy companies also 
streamline the decision-making process for their consumers, making it quick and 
easy whenever possible. For example, one successful shampoo company has an 
online decision tool that helps consumers pick a product: “The guide provides 
substantial detail but also makes narrowing and tailoring one’s choice an easy, 
transparent, step-by-step process. One-click questions about hair-type, length, and 
texture . . . and other needs . . . allow the visitor to rapidly sort through more than 
three dozen offerings to find the ideal one.”110  
                                                                                                             
 
 106. Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire 
Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995, 997 (2000). 
 107. Patrick Spenner & Karen Freeman, To Keep Your Customers, Keep It Simple, HARV. 
BUS. REV., May 2012, at 108. 
 108. Id. at 110. 
 109. Id. at 113. 
 110. Id. at 113–14. Researchers have also found that consumers’ lack of attention to multi-
ple options may cause them to adhere to defaults. See generally Stefania Sitzia, Jiwei Zheng 
& Daniel John Zizzo, Inattentive Consumers in Markets for Services, 79 THEORY & DECISION 
307, 309 (2015).  
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2. Website Design 
Experts in internet technology have also embraced simplicity. Steve Krug 
highlights the importance of simplicity and ease in his widely read book on web 
usability, aptly titled Don’t Make Me Think.111 Although the focus of the book is on 
websites and mobile applications, Krug states that his usability principles apply to 
“anything people have to interact with,” for example, an election ballot or voting 
booth.112 The ultimate goal in design is for one’s website or other product to be usable 
(or user-friendly), which Krug defines as meaning that “[a] person of average (or 
even below average) ability and experience can figure out how to use the thing to 
accomplish something without it being more trouble than it’s worth.”113 In other 
words, the key is simplicity.  
Krug’s first principle is that if you want someone to use your website (or product), 
they should be able to use it with minimal mental effort. This means that when a 
person visits a website for the first time, it should be self-evident what the point of 
the website is, where things are located, and how to use it. Any feature that is not 
obvious forces people to “puzzle” over how to use the site, which drains mental re-
sources and distracts us.114 Anything that cannot be made self-evident should be 
made self-explanatory, by relying on features like size, color and layout of text, well-
thought-out names, and minimal amounts of carefully chosen text.115 
Krug goes on to describe important aspects of how web users tend to consume 
and process information. For example: 
• People tend not to read pages but, rather, they scan them quickly and look for 
key information; 
• people are generally in a hurry. They don’t necessarily choose the best option, 
they choose the first reasonable one; 
• people generally don’t read instructions and prefer to “muddle through.” They 
generally don’t care how things work if they are able to use them; 
• people generally tolerate more steps (“clicks” on a website) if they require little 
thought and effort, as opposed to fewer steps that require a lot of thought; and 
• if people cannot find what they are looking for without a lot of effort, they will 
leave.116 
Understanding the behavior of web users, in turn, suggests further ways to 
improve website usability. Based on our behavioral tendencies, Krug recommends 
(among many other suggestions): formatting text in a way that makes it easier to scan 
(e.g., by using headings and visual hierarchies or highlighting certain text), making 
it obvious which parts of a website are “clickable,” removing any unnecessary words 
or other information, and eliminating instructions whenever possible.117  
                                                                                                             
 
 111. STEVE KRUG, DON’T MAKE ME THINK, REVISTED: A COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO 
WEB USABILITY (3d ed. 2014). 
 112. Id. at 8.  
 113. Id. at 9. 
 114. Id. at 11–15. 
 115. Id. at 18. 
 116. Id. at 22, 24–26, 43, 51, 59. 
 117. See id. at 29–51. 
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B. Simplification in Practice 
These simplicity principles have been successfully implemented in a number of 
real world settings. For example, offering employees a simplified procedure to enroll 
in a 401(k) plan—one where the contribution rate and asset allocation are preselected 
by the employer—has been shown to significantly increase 401(k) enrollment.118 
Additionally, offering chronically ill patients simplified dosing procedures has been 
shown to increase compliance with prescribed medication regimens.119 Regulators 
have also embraced simplification as a means to increase uptake in government pro-
grams.120 Cass Sunstein, the former Administrator of the White House Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, notes that government agencies have produced 
seventy-two simplification initiatives in recent years in response to a request from 
the Obama administration to “increase administrative simplification” and promote 
more electronic reporting.121 For example, the Free Application for Federal Student 
Aid (FAFSA) has been made shorter, simpler, and more automated, with the goal of 
increasing access to college.122 And the Treasury Department has implemented an 
electronic delivery system for recipients of Social Security and Supplemental 
Security Income benefits, under which individuals automatically receive the funds 
on a prepaid debit card.123 In making his case for simplified procedures across all 
areas of government, Sunstein argues that “[c]omplexity can have serious unintended 
effects (including indifference, delay, and confusion), potentially undermining 
regulatory goals by reducing compliance or decreasing the likelihood that people will 
benefit from various policies and programs.”124 
C. Making Taxpaying More User-Friendly 
Policy makers who wish to encourage taxpayers to comply with their tax 
obligations should keep the above-described principles in mind. By making people’s 
interactions with the tax system more user-friendly, we should be able to encourage 
more voluntary participation. The remainder of this part explores specific policy pro-
posals with that goal in mind. 
1. More Information Reporting  
One way that policy makers could ease the burden of taxpaying is to subject more 
                                                                                                             
 
 118. James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, Reducing the Complexity Costs 
of 401(k) Participation Through Quick Enrollment, in DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMICS OF 
AGING 57 (David A. Wise ed. 2009). 
 119. Sripal Bangalore, Gayathri Kamalakkannan, Sanobar Parkar & Franz H. Messerli, 
Fixed-Dose Combinations Improve Medication Compliance: A Meta-Analysis, 120 AM. J. 
MED. 713, 713 (2007). 
 120. Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 
1402–04 (2011). 
 121. Id. at 1403. 
 122. Id. at 1402. 
 123. Id. at 1403. Notably, the card is not available for receipt of a tax refund. 
 124. Id. at 1402. 
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income to third-party information reporting.125 The most obvious upside of infor-
mation reporting is the clear deterrence benefit: income that is reported to the IRS by 
third parties is all but impossible for taxpayers to conceal without detection. But 
information reporting provides a simplification benefit, as well, that should not be 
overlooked.  
Certain types of income, like self-employment income and some income earned 
by independent contractors, is not reported to the IRS by third parties.126 Un-
surprisingly, there is a significantly lower tax compliance rate for such income (only 
forty-four percent reported accurately).127 Although increased opportunity to cheat 
undoubtedly plays a role in lower compliance here, there is also increased procedural 
complexity for taxpayers who earn income that is not subject to information report-
ing. An enormous advantage of information reporting for taxpayers is that it is 
essentially equivalent to recordkeeping by the third parties that report the income. 
Taxpayers who earn income that is not reported by third parties may fail to report 
accurately not just because they think they can get away with it, but because they 
were too lazy to keep proper records. 
Consider a taxpayer who earns various types of investment income in the form of 
interest and dividends from multiple accounts. For each of those accounts, he will 
receive a Form 1099-INT reporting the income he earned at year-end, which he is 
likely to rely on to prepare his tax return. Not receiving those tax forms would require 
the taxpayer to consult his records with each financial institution to determine the 
amount of taxable income (if any) for the year. It would also require him to keep 
track of which accounts were taxable and which were not. In isolation these are seem-
ingly simple tasks, but in the aggregate they impose additional procedural burdens 
on taxpayers who are already disinclined to put effort into taxpaying.  
 Not all income is amenable to third-party information reporting.128 For example, 
cash income earned from selling products to consumers wouldn’t be a good candidate 
because it would be impracticable to require consumers to send the IRS an infor-
mation statement based on each individual purchase.129 But the justification for not 
requiring information reporting on other types of income is less clear. For example, 
payments made to independent contractors for services are generally reportable on 
Form 1099-MISC if the payments exceed $600, but the payments are not reportable 
if the payments are made for goods instead of services, or if the payments are made 
to a corporation instead of an individual.130 There does not appear to be a strong 
                                                                                                             
 
 125. An example of third-party information reporting is when a bank reports interest in-
come to the taxpayer on Form 1099-INT. The taxpayer receives the tax form from the bank 
and uses the information to report her interest income on her tax return. The bank also sends 
the information to the IRS. 
 126. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 2, tbl.1. 
 127. See id. On the other hand, income subject to substantial information reporting has a 
ninety-two percent compliance rate. Id. 
 128. For an in-depth discussion of what kinds of income are best suited for information 
reporting, see Leandra Lederman, Essay, Reducing Information Gaps To Reduce the Tax Gap: 
When Is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733 (2010). 
 129. However, certain credit card purchases do have to be reported by the credit card com-
pany. See I.R.C. § 6050W (2012). 
 130. The payments are only reportable if they are made in the course of the payor’s trade 
2017] USER-FRIENDLY TAXPAYING  1535 
 
justification for these carve-outs, and information reporting could be expanded here 
to cover sales of goods for more than $600 and payments to corporations.131 Where 
more third-party information reporting is feasible, policy makers should consider 
requiring it to further simplify taxpaying and improve compliance.132  
2. Taxpayer Accounts 
Policy makers could also reduce procedural complexity for taxpayers through the 
use of online taxpayer accounts. These accounts should incorporate two key features. 
First, they should constitute a “one stop shop” where taxpayers can manage various 
aspects of their tax situation online in a single location. Second, they should allow 
for automatic retrieval of third-party information returns, as discussed more below. 
a. Online Taxpayer Portal 
Each taxpayer should be provided with access to a secure online portal that 
contains easily accessible personal tax information and links to relevant tax re-
sources. The IRS had already started to build a similar online portal system for 
taxpayers called “My IRS Account,” but the project was cancelled in 2009 after 
nearly three years of development.133 The My IRS Account project was intended to 
unify already existing IRS portals134 and allow taxpayers to access and manage cer-
tain tax information online, similar to online banking.135 Treasury officials cited 
inadequate funding and the absence of a “viable, agreed-upon . . . business strategy” 
as the reason for the cancellation of the project.136 
Developing an online taxpayer account is no less important today, despite the 
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however. 
 136. Duarte, supra note 135. 
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2009 failure of the My IRS Account project for lack of a clear vision. The Electronic 
Tax Administration Advisory Committee (ETAAC) recently recommended reviving 
the project in its 2014 Annual Report to Congress,137 calling for a “[s]ecure, personal-
ized online IRS account . . . that increases voluntary compliance, decreases burden, 
lowers IRS customer service costs, and encourages e-filing.”138 The EAATC mem-
bers noted that successful companies like banks and retailers have already taken a 
“comprehensive approach to the online customer experience,” and the IRS should 
follow suit.139  
These ETAAC recommendations call for a single online platform on which 
taxpayers could access some tax information, manage certain tax affairs, and interact 
with the IRS.140 One important aspect of the account proposed by the ETAAC would 
be integrating online services already available to taxpayers (as the My IRS Account 
project intended), like checking tax refund status, retrieving tax transcripts, and mak-
ing tax payments.141 The ETAAC members also recommend allowing taxpayers to 
view communications from the IRS online, view the status of unresolved tax issues, 
address underpayments and penalties, and respond to IRS inquiries.142 They further 
recommend that the account provide tools specific to the individual’s tax situation, 
such as an interactive tool for the Earned Income Tax Credit for a low-income 
individual.143 Several states have already instituted online taxpayer accounts that al-
low taxpayers to do things like pay tax bills, manage estimated tax accounts, receive 
email notifications of items like refunds and bills, and view their payment history.144  
Providing numerous taxpayer services in one place would greatly simplify 
taxpaying. As recommended by the ETAAC, the online account should allow taxpay-
ers to do things like communicate with the IRS, view and pay bills, and access 
interactive tools relevant to their specific tax situation. Those tools should be mod-
eled on web usability principles and should therefore be self-explanatory and easy to 
navigate with minimal effort. The time and effort taxpayers currently must spend to 
                                                                                                             
 
 137. ELEC. TAX ADMIN. ADVISORY COMM., PUB. 3415, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
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track down resources for various tasks in different places causes them to expend pre-
cious mental energy. 145  
The government has already implemented a similar system to allow individuals 
to enroll for healthcare via the government website HealthCare.gov. HealthCare.gov 
is an online marketplace that allows insurance consumers to compare and shop for 
different insurance plans, enroll in plans, obtain information about relevant dates and 
deadlines, find local help centers, or access online help all in one place.146 Because 
insurance coverage is now required under the Affordable Care Act, the goal of the 
site is to make enrollment as user-friendly as possible to encourage compliance with 
the new requirements.147 Although the initial rollout of the website was plagued with 
numerous technical difficulties,148 the site was essentially functioning as intended by 
the fall of 2014.149 By similarly streamlining the taxpaying process for individuals 
through use of a one-stop online portal, policy makers can encourage better tax 
compliance. 
b. Third-Party Data Retrieval 
Instituting an online account like that envisioned by the ETAAC would be 
enormously beneficial to taxpayers. Additionally, to further simplify the taxpaying 
process, the accounts should allow taxpayers to access and review all of their third-
party information returns online (which is not contemplated by the current ETAAC 
                                                                                                             
 
 145. One self-employed taxpayer with whom I discussed this proposal told me that one of 
the biggest headaches of self-preparing his tax return is that IRS publications frequently cross-
reference one another, and he can never find all of the publications he needs in one place. The 
result, he said, is that he spends a lot of time having to go look for new documents. A self-
employed taxpayer should be able to access a personal tax page that links to all relevant tax 
forms, instructions, and publications from one place.  
 146. HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov [https://perma.cc/PF28-KWWM]. 
 147. See, e.g., Alex Wayne, New Healthcare.gov CEO Pursues User-Friendly Goal, 
TELEGRAM.COM (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.telegram.com/article/20141002/NEWS/310029628/1237# 
[https://perma.cc/73C9-7LFE]. 
 148. See, e.g., MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, BEHIND 
THE CURTAIN OF THE HEALTHCARE.GOV ROLLOUT (2014), http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content 
/uploads/2014/09/Healthcare-gov-Report-Final-9-17-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EFR-FZJV]; 
Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, HealthCare.gov Marred by Technical Problems on Signup Dead-
line Day, PBS NEWSHOUR: RUNDOWN (Mar. 31, 2014, 9:28 AM), http://www.pbs.org 
/newshour/rundown/healthcare-gov-nearly-4-hours-signup-deadline-day [https://perma.cc/6B74 
-Z7TB]; Ed Payne, Matt Smith & Tom Cohen, Report: Healthcare Website Failed Test Ahead 
of Rollout, CNN POLITICS (Oct. 22, 2013, 9:03 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/22/politics 
/obamacare-website-problems [https://perma.cc/P8Z9-NMSP]. 
 149. For example, over one million people applied for coverage during the first week of 
enrollment in the fall of 2014. See Robert Pear, In First Week, More Than a Million Apply for 
Health Insurance on Federal Website, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2014/11/27/us/politics/obamacare-aca-1-million-sign-ups.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/FC8Z 
-ALZL]; see also Robert Pear, Some Hiccups, but Federal Health Exchange Website Is in 
Good Health, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/17/us/politics 
/some-hiccups-but-federal-health-exchange-website-is-in-good-health.html [https://perma.cc 
/JTD5-7U2D]. 
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proposal). All Forms 1098 or 1099 that would be mailed to the taxpayer by third 
parties would be automatically posted online and viewable from the taxpayer’s ac-
count.150 When it comes time to file a tax return, the online portal should allow 
taxpayers to automatically transfer all of this data onto their tax return. This would, 
for example, obviate the need for taxpayers to manually input information related to 
sales of investments (reported on Form 1099-B) into a software program, as de-
scribed above in Part I.151 
Several commentators have advocated for such a “data retrieval” system,152 which 
could import the information onto the correct line item on the taxpayer’s return and 
make simple calculations such as adding up all of one’s interest income.153 They have 
noted that such a system would allow taxpayers to avoid the burden of collecting 
paper statements, figuring out which line to report them on, and manually entering 
the information (whether with software or by hand), along with eliminating potential 
anxiety over having lost a Form 1099.154 A large amount of taxpayer data already 
subject to information reporting could be included in the data retrieval system, such 
as certain independent contractor income, income from interest, dividends, and capi-
tal gains from a brokerage account, state income tax refunds, royalties, shares of 
partnership gains and losses, deductible mortgage interest, and deductible state and 
local property taxes.155  
                                                                                                             
 
 150. One important concern here would be security, both in the objective sense (would 
taxpayers’ data be secure?) and from a public perception standpoint (would taxpayers be afraid 
to use the accounts because of security concerns?). Ajay Mehrotra argues that “recent experi-
ences with national-security surveillance, the initial implementation of the Affordable Care 
Act, and breaches of online privacy” indicate that “the federal government is not the best 
institution to provide . . . a clearinghouse of third-party information.” Ajay Mehrotra, Reviving 
Fiscal Citizenship, 113 MICH. L. REV. 943, 966 (2015) (reviewing ZELENAK, supra note 11). 
However, private companies face security breaches too, so security concerns don’t necessarily 
mean the government’s management of online data is inferior. Additionally, improvements in 
technology and learning from past mishaps should make secure databases increasingly diffi-
cult to breach in future years. Taxpayer concerns could be eased over time by slowly rolling 
out new products among smaller groups of willing participants first.  
 151. As summarized in the table in Part I, reporting proceeds from sales of investments 
(reported by brokers on Form 1099-B) is an example of low substantive complexity accompa-
nied by high procedural complexity. 
 152. See ZELENAK, supra note 11, at 124; Joseph Bankman, Using Technology To Simplify 
Individual Tax Filing, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 773 (2008); Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Americans Don’t 
Hate Taxes, They Hate Paying Taxes, 44 U.B.C. L. REV. 835 (2011); Jay A. Soled, Requiem 
for Paper Information Statements, 128 TAX NOTES 658 (Aug. 9, 2010). 
 153. Bankman, supra note 152, at 775. 
 154. Id.; Soled, supra note 152. Soled notes that the workload of the third parties reporting 
information would also be reduced because they would only have to provide the information 
to the IRS (who would provide it to the taxpayer), rather than having to provide it separately 
to the IRS and taxpayers. Id. 
 155. Bankman, supra note 152, at 774; Ventry, supra note 152, at 863. The idea of online 
access to third-party data and an associated taxpayer account has gained traction in recent 
years. Data retrieval was endorsed by President Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board 
in 2010, by the then-commissioner of the IRS in 2010 and by the IRS’s Electronic Tax 
Administration Advisory Committee in 2007. See Bankman, supra note 152, at 775; Ventry, 
supra note 152, at 865; see also ECON. RECOVERY ADVISORY BD., THE REPORT ON TAX 
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Instituting an integrated online taxpayer account would be an important step 
towards reducing the procedural complexity of the taxpaying process. Further, allow-
ing for data retrieval would greatly simplify tax return preparation for a significant 
number of taxpayers. Requiring taxpayers to collect and keep track of information 
returns and then manually enter the information during the tax-preparation process156 
creates an unnecessary headache, particularly given that the IRS already has the 
information from the third parties that reported it. Allowing taxpayers to automati-
cally view and retrieve the information in one place would be a worthwhile reduction 
of effort for taxpayers with little or no added effort for the third-party reporters.157 
3. Simplified Tax Returns 
A taxpayer’s personal tax account should also be linked to an online version of 
the taxpayer’s annual tax return. Online tax data such as that reported on Form 1099 
should be automatically transferrable to the return. There are several options to sim-
plify the process of online tax return preparation,158 and the federal government and 
some states have already considered some of them. As discussed below, this Article 
argues that simplified, taxpayer-prepared returns are preferable to government-
prepared tax returns.  
                                                                                                             
 
REFORM OPTIONS: SIMPLIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND CORPORATE TAXATION (2010), https:// 
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Tax-Reform-Options-2010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L5JY-5SSX]; ELEC. TAX ADMIN. ADVISORY COMM., ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 35–36 (2011), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p3415--2011.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/6MTX-6B3K]; Doug Shulman, Prepared Remarks of IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman at 
the National Press Club, INTERNAL REV. SERV. (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/uac 
/Prepared-Remarks-of-IRS-Commissioner-Doug-Shulman-at-the-National-Press-Club-1 [https:// 
perma.cc/SZP7-MCNV]. 
 156. This assumes the taxpayer does not use a tax-return preparer. But even taxpayers that 
use preparers have to collect and keep track of their information returns so that they can be 
turned over to the preparer.  
 157. In fact, their efforts should also be reduced. See supra note 154. Another potential 
issue would be whether the third-party data could be made available in time for taxpayers to 
file their returns. But although data retrieval may require the third-party reporters to provide 
information to the IRS on a slightly accelerated basis, states like California have demonstrated 
that it is possible and not unduly burdensome. See Bankman, supra note 152, at 777–78 (noting 
that companies would have to provide data one to two months earlier or move to a system 
where they provided it quarterly); see also Ventry, supra note 152, at 871. 
 158. Another simplification option is to shift to an entirely return-free tax system. This 
could be accomplished for some taxpayers through an exact-withholding regime, such as that 
used in countries like the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany, where a taxpayer’s entire tax 
liability is satisfied through withholding during the year. See DEP’T OF TREAS., REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS ON RETURN-FREE TAX SYSTEMS: TAX SIMPLIFICATION IS A PREREQUISITE 7 (2003), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Return-Free-2003.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5GBQ-QGJT]. However, a Treasury report that studied return-free filing 
concluded that the underlying tax laws in the United States would have to be substantially 
simplified before such a regime were feasible. See id. at 2–6. A return-free system could also 
be accomplished by shifting to a consumption tax, which would also require a substantive 
overhaul of our tax laws. See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 24, at 198–204.  
1540 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:1509 
 
a. Government-Prepared Tax Returns 
One possibility is to shift to a “tax agency reconciliation system,” whereby the 
IRS would prepare the taxpayer’s return for her based on information reported by 
third parties.159 The taxpayer could have the option to review the return online, make 
necessary additions, correct any errors, and electronically sign and file it. Third-
party-reported data could automatically be imported onto a Form 1040 and simple 
calculations made for the taxpayer. Because not all income and deductions are sub-
ject to third-party information reporting, many taxpayers (e.g., those who earned cash 
income or claimed itemized deductions like charitable contributions) would have to 
make manual additions to supplement the return.160 
Several legal and economic experts have advocated for a federal tax reconciliation 
agency system,161 and a “simple return” bill calling for government-prepared tax re-
turns has twice been introduced in Congress.162 However, the idea has failed to gain 
political traction at the federal level, in large part due to staunch opposition by the 
tax-preparation software industry.163 California instituted a tax agency reconciliation 
program in 2007 called ReadyReturn, under which eligible taxpayers can elect to 
review and file a pre-prepared state tax return.164 That program also faced fierce 
industry opposition from companies like Intuit (the maker of TurboTax software),165 
and thus far it appears only a small percentage of those California taxpayers eligible 
to use the program are doing so.166  
                                                                                                             
 
 159. DEP’T OF TREAS., supra note 158, at 11. 
 160. About forty percent of taxpayers claim the standard deduction and earn only income 
subject to information reporting, which would allow them to file an unrevised return. 
ZELENAK, supra note 11, at 121–22. 
 161. See, e.g., AUSTAN GOOLSBEE, THE ‘SIMPLE RETURN’: REDUCING AMERICA’S TAX 
BURDEN THROUGH RETURN-FREE FILING (2006), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content 
/uploads/2016/06/200607goolsbee.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XVJ-KU6]; ZELENAK, supra note 
11, at 121–23;  Bankman, supra note 152, at 782–83. 
 162. H.R. 1069, 112th Cong. (2011); Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification Act of 
2011, S. 727, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 163. See, e.g., Liz Day, How the Maker of TurboTax Fought Free, Simple Tax Filing, 
PROPUBLICA (Mar. 26, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-maker-of 
-turbotax-fought-free-simple-tax-filing [https://perma.cc/4LFH-J7US]. 
 164. See FTB REPORT, supra note 144, at 3; Bankman, supra note 152, at 783–85. Only 
taxpayers with relatively simple tax situations—those who are single, earn wage income only, 
and do not itemize—are eligible. See CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., FTB 971, READYRETURN 
SERVICE—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2007), https://www.ftb.ca.gov/readyReturn 
/readyreturn.971.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HGD-SMRT]. Government-prepared returns are used 
in some other countries, as well. Joseph Bankman, Clifford Nass & Joel Slemrod, Using the 
“Smart Return” To Reduce Tax Evasion 20 (Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 
2578432, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2578432 [https://perma 
.cc/58AV-HN3L] (Finland and Sweden).  
 165. See ZELENAK, supra note 11, at 122. 
 166. In 2008, just over 60,000 taxpayers filed ReadyReturns out of nearly two million who 
were eligible. STATE OF CAL., FRANCHISE TAX BD., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 4 (2009), 
https://www.ftb.ca.gov/readyReturn/ReadyReturnReport2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3TC-YJ4D]. 
In 2014, only 75,000 ReadyReturns were filed. FTB REPORT, supra note 144, at 3. However, 
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Advocates of federal government-prepared returns have argued that they would 
not only greatly reduce taxpayer time and effort, but that they would also promote 
“fiscal citizenship” by reducing negative feelings about paying taxes.167 The idea 
behind the latter argument is that filing taxes connects us to the income tax system 
in a meaningful way, and thus active participation in the process should be encour-
aged.168 On the other hand, there has been criticism of programs like ReadyReturn 
beyond pressure from the tax software companies. For example, some have argued 
that federal pre-prepared returns would give too much power to the government and 
make tax increases less visible to the public.169 Others have expressed concerns that 
government-prepared returns may reduce overall tax compliance because taxpayers 
may be disinclined to report additional income that isn’t already reported on the pre-
prepared return.170  
Another relevant consideration is how the behavioral science research discussed 
in Part II can inform our understanding of how taxpayers would interact with a pre-
prepared tax return. Individuals’ general preference for passivity seems to indicate 
that taxpayers would be inclined to accept a pre-prepared return as is without making 
modifications. For taxpayers with simple tax situations that are fully covered on a 
pre-prepared return, this probably doesn’t matter much from a revenue standpoint.171  
It’s less clear what would happen when taxpayers were confronted with a partially 
pre-prepared return that required them to input additional income and/or deductions. 
                                                                                                             
 
the overwhelming majority of those that do use ReadyReturn are pleased with it. See STATE 
OF CAL., FRANCHISE TAX BD., TAXPAYERS’ BILL OF RIGHTS ANNUAL REPORT TO THE 
LEGISLATURE 8 (2013),  https://www.ftb.ca.gov/aboutFTB/taxpayer_advocate/2013_BillRights 
AnnlReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/888K-FH22] (reporting that over ninety-eight percent of 
users are “satisfied” or “very satisfied”); see also Bankman, supra note 152, at 784–85. 
Further, the low participation rates of the California system probably understate the potential 
participation rates of a similar federal system, because taxpayers likely make state return 
choices based off of how they file their federal return. See Bankman, supra note 152, at 785. 
 167. See, e.g., ZELENAK, supra note 11, at 123 (arguing that tax agency reconciliation 
“might restore the virtues of a return-based income tax as an exercise in participatory democ-
racy”); Bankman, supra note 152, at 787. 
 168. See, e.g., ZELENAK, supra note 11, at 4; Bankman, supra note 152, at 787. 
 169. See, e.g., Grover Norquist, President, Ams. for Tax Reform, Implementing a “Return 
Free” Tax Filing Scheme: Presentation to the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax 
Reform (2005) (unpublished presentation), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel 
/meetings/docs/norquist_05172005.ppt [https://perma.cc/5ME2-54XS]. While Norquist fears 
that government-prepared returns would allow the IRS to overstate taxpayers’ liability, 
Bankman argues that it is more likely that government-prepared returns would understate tax 
liability overall because they would not include income that is not reported by third parties. 
See Bankman, supra note 152, at 786.  
 170. See, e.g., Joann M. Weiner, Panelists Weigh Pros and Cons of Federal Ready Return 
Program, 119 TAX NOTES 1133 (2008). Bankman argues that this shouldn’t cause a substantial 
decrease in compliance, because taxpayers often fail to report income that is not subject to 
third-party reporting anyway. See Bankman, supra note 152, at 786–87. 
 171. If all of the taxpayer’s income and deductions were reported to the IRS by third par-
ties, then presumably the returns would be accurate in most cases. Even if there were inaccura-
cies in some returns, it’s not clear that taxable income would be understated any more than it 
was overstated.  
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Consider, for example, a taxpayer with $10,000 of independent contractor income 
that was not subject to third-party reporting. Assume he also earns wage and interest 
income each year and claims the standard deduction. When reviewing his tax return, 
the wage income and interest income would already be entered on the appropriate 
lines, as would the standard deduction. However, he would have to voluntarily add 
the $10,000 of additional income to the return.172 He could be prompted to do this in 
any number of ways: he might be presented with a statement informing him that he 
has to report additional income not already on the return, he might be prompted to 
check yes or no in response to a question about whether or not he has additional 
income to report, or he might simply be instructed to sign the return unless he has 
additions to make or needs to correct errors.173  
The relevant question here is not merely whether the taxpayer would voluntarily 
report the $10,000 income, but whether he is more or less likely to report it in the 
pre-prepared return scenario as compared to the current system. At present, many 
taxpayers fail to report income that is not reported by third parties.174 It is possible 
that those honest taxpayers who would report the income under today’s filing system 
would similarly report it on a pre-prepared return, and vice versa. Or, it’s possible 
that, by making tax filing more passive overall, taxpayers will be less likely to ac-
tively volunteer that they have unreported income, particularly if they could do some-
thing as simple as check a box that says they agree with their return as pre-
prepared.175 If the latter scenario is accurate, pre-prepared returns could have a 
negative impact on overall tax compliance.  
In any event, even if there is no clear revenue impact, taxpayer passivity probably 
does matter from a fiscal citizenship perspective. If a goal of simplified tax returns 
is to promote tax consciousness and fiscal citizenship by connecting taxpayers with 
the filing process in a more positive way, this benefit may not be recognized if 
taxpayers are mindlessly accepting pre-prepared returns with little or no conscious 
involvement. This appears to be a likely scenario for at least some taxpayers in light 
of the behavioral studies described above. Because our tendency for passivity will 
likely encourage many taxpayers to virtually ignore their pre-prepared returns, a 
more active approach to return preparation is desirable.  
b. Taxpayer-Prepared Returns Linked to Taxpayer Accounts 
A better option is to continue to require taxpayers (or their tax return preparer)176 
to prepare their tax returns, but to rely on the data in the taxpayer’s online account to 
                                                                                                             
 
 172. This is assuming that the federal program would apply more broadly than the 
ReadyReturn program, which is limited to taxpayers that have wage income only. Condition-
ing the use of pre-prepared returns on wage income, or income subject to third-party reporting, 
might discourage reporting of other types of income for taxpayers who earned unreported in-
come but want to use pre-prepared returns.  
 173. The last option would probably encourage the most passive response. For sample text, 
see Bankman, supra note 152, at 782–83.  
 174. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 175. Cf. Bankman et al., supra note 164, at 5–6 (suggesting that forcing taxpayers to lie by 
commission rather than omission might reduce evasion). 
 176. Tax return preparers are discussed further below in Part IV.D.1. 
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make the process significantly less burdensome. The taxpayer’s personal account 
should have an easily accessible link for “Prepare Tax Return.” Taxpayers should be 
able to stop work on the return at any time and return to find their work saved when 
they log back into their account.  
The first step in preparing their electronic return should be a page that allows 
taxpayers to review their personal information (automatically imported from their 
taxpayer account), such as marital status and number of dependents. If the infor-
mation is correct, it would be automatically entered onto the return once the taxpayer 
checks a box verifying its accuracy. If it is incorrect, taxpayers should be given the 
option to update it and have their corrected version automatically transferred to the 
return.  
Next, the taxpayer should be guided through all of the third-party data that has 
been posted to her account.177 For each form (e.g., Form 1099), a taxpayer should 
have the option to review the data and be presented with two options. One option 
would be to click a button that said something like “This is not correct,” which would 
take her to a help page that would allow her to electronically communicate about the 
error with either the IRS or the reporting third party (or both). The second option, 
which would presumably apply in most cases (where there was no error), would be 
to click something to the effect of “Export to tax return.” The account data would 
then automatically be added to the relevant line on the tax return and combined with 
any additional data (e.g., interest amounts would automatically be added together). 
By requiring each piece of data to be individually exported, taxpayers would be 
encouraged to consider all of the income and deductions being transferred to their 
tax returns, making them less likely to mentally disengage. However, by allowing 
them to view it online and export it with one simple click, the process would be 
considerably easier and less time-consuming. 
Many taxpayers—those whose income and deductions are covered by third-party 
reporting and/or the standard deduction—would be finished at this point. For those 
with more complex tax situations or additional income to report, there are several 
options. Taxpayers could be prompted with a menu of different options that would 
allow them to manually choose which income or deductions they wanted to enter. Or 
taxpayers could be taken through a checklist where they select “yes” or “no” to a 
number of common additional sources of income and deductions.178 The approach 
could be modeled off of that used by tax-preparation software companies, which 
generally allow taxpayers the option to be guided through the process or to select 
income and deduction items on their own. 
Taxpayer passivity remains a concern when considering whether taxpayers would 
fail to report certain items of income on their return that were not already posted to 
                                                                                                             
 
 177. Taxpayers should also be given the opportunity to review that third-party data 
independent of preparing their tax returns. For example, they might receive an email notifica-
tion every time third-party data is posted to their account with a link that lets them access and 
review it. 
 178. Bankman, Nass, and Slemrod propose a “Smart Return,” which would use data-driven 
interactive systems to tailor specific questions to individual taxpayers, the same way that a 
company like Amazon might tailor product recommendations to a customer. Bankman et al., 
supra note 164, at 18. 
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their taxpayer accounts.179 One way to alleviate this might be to require, as part of 
the electronic tax-preparation process, taxpayers to affirmatively indicate that they 
do not have any additional sources of income by entering a “zero” when prompted.180 
While this extra step wouldn’t encourage all dishonest taxpayers to come clean, it 
would, at the very least, prevent not reporting the income from being the default 
position. At the same time, the tax-filing process would be less mentally burdensome 
overall, leaving taxpayers with more mental resources to expend on meeting their tax 
obligations. 
4. Tax Reporting on a Rolling Basis 
Policy makers could further simplify taxpaying by allowing taxpayers to keep 
records and make midyear tax-return entries through their taxpayer accounts. This 
would help taxpayers organize their tax information in one place, easily keep track 
of it without fear of forgetting something, and reduce taxpayer time and effort at the 
end of the year when it was time to prepare a tax return. Consider charitable contribu-
tions, for example, which generally are deductible for itemizers181 but currently are 
not subject to third-party information reporting. To deduct cash contributions, 
taxpayers must keep bank records, records of payroll deductions, or receipts182 and 
then add their contributions together and report them on Schedule A to Form 1040 
(Itemized Deductions).183 Some taxpayers may find themselves scrambling to collect 
receipts or bank records at tax time and may find the process of claiming multiple 
deductions arduous and time-consuming.  
A more convenient approach would be to allow taxpayers to log on to their tax 
account and enter each charitable donation as soon as they make it. They could click 
on a button that specifically links them to “Charitable Contributions” and be pre-
sented with a simple menu giving them options to “Enter a new donation” or “Get 
help” if they needed to view summaries of applicable rules.184 “Enter a new donation” 
would link them to a page where they could input information about the charity and 
the amount donated. Taxpayers could be reminded with a brief statement that they 
                                                                                                             
 
 179. IRS data on noncompliance suggests that taxpayers are far more likely to underreport 
income than they are to overstate deductions. See Thomas, supra note 101, at 128 n.109. 
 180. Similarly, some states require taxpayers to affirmatively report that they do not owe 
use tax.  
 181. Certain limitations apply but likely do not affect the majority of taxpayers. For exam-
ple, deductions for contributions to charitable organizations like churches or schools are gener-
ally limited to fifty percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) 
(West Supp. 2016). 
 182.  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 526, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 18–19 (2017). 
For cash contributions over $250, the taxpayer must obtain a written acknowledgement from 
the charitable organization with specific information, such as whether the taxpayer received 
any goods or services in exchange for his contribution. Id. at 17–18. Additional rules apply for 
non-cash donations. See id. at 18–19. 
 183. Although tax-preparation software will do the math, taxpayers generally must input 
each charitable contribution separately at the time they file their tax return, which can be time-
consuming if many donations have been made. 
 184. The “Get help” page could have a list of frequently asked questions that included 
information on things like how much to deduct for noncash contributions. 
2017] USER-FRIENDLY TAXPAYING  1545 
 
are required to keep their acknowledgement from the charity (or, for smaller dona-
tions, a bank record or check)185 as evidence of their deduction. It should save infor-
mation about charities donated to in prior years. When the taxpayer is preparing her 
return at year-end, she should be able to view the donations she entered during the 
year and have a simple option to export the information automatically to her return.186  
Taxpayers should have the option to enter other deductible items into their tax 
accounts on a rolling basis as well. For example, certain deductible property taxes 
are not automatically reported to the IRS,187 and taxpayers could be given the option 
to enter those payments in their account as they are made on a quarterly basis. They 
could also be given the option to report other deductible expenses like alimony or 
medical expenses as they are incurred during the year. These expenses could be 
stored in taxpayer accounts and accessible to review and export at year-end when 
taxpayers are preparing returns.188  
Although making it easier for taxpayers to claim deductions may seem like a 
revenue loser at first glance, the point here is to simplify the entire process of tax 
preparation. Taxpayers are probably more motivated to expend mental effort to claim 
deductions (because deductions save them tax), but that mental effort is still deplet-
ing. Taxpayers who spend hours, for example, collecting records and inputting 
deductible items on their tax return may be less likely to report items of income hon-
estly because they are mentally exhausted. Thus, there is merit to simplifying all 
aspects of taxpaying, including the process of claiming deductions.  
Taxpayers should be able to record items of income on a rolling basis as well. 
This would be particularly helpful for independent contractors, for example, whose 
income might be reported at year-end on a Form 1099-K, but who might otherwise 
not pay taxes through withholding during the year. Such taxpayers could log into 
their taxpayer accounts and enter income at the end of each month, or each time they 
received a paycheck. They could also opt into a feature that would allow them to 
                                                                                                             
 
 185. See supra note 182. 
 186. TurboTax offers a well-designed feature called “ItsDeductible” that allows taxpayers 
to track their deductions midyear and has recently rolled out a mobile app version of it. 
ItsDeductible Online, TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com/personal-taxes/itsdeductible/ 
[https://perma.cc/PSW9-77QY]. The service is free to download online but can only be im-
ported onto the year-end tax return under the “Deluxe” package (starting at $34.99) or one of 
the more expensive packages. See Products & Pricing, TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com 
/personal-taxes [https://perma.cc/T3Y6-C4L4]. The IRS could rely on private companies to 
institute this feature or design their own version. This is discussed further below in Part IV.D.1. 
 187. Taxpayers with mortgages are likely to pay property taxes on their homes through 
escrow with the lending bank and will thus receive information about taxes paid from the bank 
(which will also report that information to the IRS). However, property owners that own their 
property outright are likely to pay property taxes directly to the local taxing authority and thus 
must keep their own records for federal tax deduction purposes. See Andrew T. Hayashi, The 
Legal Salience of Taxation, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1443, 1457 (2014). 
 188. Deductions for many expenses are limited under the tax laws by certain caps and/or 
floors. For example, medical expenses are only deductible to the extent they exceed ten percent 
of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 213(a) (2012). Currently, tax-preparation 
software programs calculate these limitations for the taxpayer, and the return-filing program 
linked to the taxpayer’s account could do the same thing. Tax-preparation software is dis-
cussed more below in Part IV.D.1. 
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receive an email reminder on a regular basis (e.g., once per month) to record their 
income. Not only would this help taxpayers keep and locate records of income that 
would be available at the time they prepared their year-end tax return, it would also 
help those taxpayers who must pay quarterly estimated taxes. For example, taxpayers 
might be able to click an “Estimated taxes” button after they report certain types of 
income that brings them to a page that would help them estimate the amount they 
must pay at the end of each quarter,189 and a link that would allow them to make the 
payment directly from the website. 
Allowing taxpayers to report items of income and deduction through taxpayer 
accounts on a rolling basis would make taxpaying more user-friendly for several rea-
sons. First, it would break the process of tax reporting into very small steps spread 
out over time. This should make reporting less mentally depleting than sifting 
through various items of income and deductions and making entries in one sitting, 
whether the taxpayer does it by hand or with tax-preparation software. Additionally, 
recording items within a short time frame will help forgetful taxpayers remember 
what they spent or earned, and this could be bolstered with email reminders if the 
taxpayer so elects. This might also alleviate any anxiety taxpayers may experience 
over losing records or potentially forgetting a relevant transaction.190 Further, doing 
much of the legwork of return preparation in advance should make the overall year-
end tax preparation significantly easier and faster. If taxpayers have to spend fewer 
mental resources gathering deductions, for example, they will retain more energy to 
focus on any remaining matters that haven’t already been dealt with through their 
taxpayer accounts. 
5. Make Low Compliance Areas User-Friendly 
Finally, policy makers could identify areas that have particularly low compliance 
rates and design web tools that are specifically geared at making the compliance pro-
cess as easy as possible. The IRS could follow the lead of experts in marketing and 
website design to encourage voluntary tax compliance using techniques similar to 
those employed to encourage consumers to purchase a product or use a website. 
a. Nanny Taxes 
As a case study, consider a hypothetical taxpayer who hires a nanny to care for 
his children after school at a salary of $100/week. Assume our taxpayer knows of the 
“nanny tax” but has never paid it and is unsure of what is required.191 Household 
                                                                                                             
 
 189. The amount of the payment could be based off of last year’s tax liability or the current 
year’s earnings. See generally I.R.C. § 6654 (2010) (estimated tax required to avoid penalties). 
 190. Another self-employed taxpayer told me that he keeps boxes of paper receipts, which 
creates a burdensome and time-consuming process at tax time of claiming expenses. However, 
he said that the reason he no longer uses a software program to log his expenses is because he 
had a hard drive failure that caused him to lose a large amount of data that wasn’t backed up. 
Items of income and expense logged into online taxpayer accounts could be automatically 
backed up and could alleviate taxpayer concerns about losing their records.  
 191. Taxpayers generally must pay social security, Medicare, and federal unemployment 
taxes for household employees like babysitters who are paid at least $2000 per year or $1000 
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employees like nannies are frequently not reported for tax purposes,192 and whether 
or not this taxpayer decides to comply may depend, in part, on how much trouble he 
thinks it will be. To investigate, he may begin with a simple Google search of some-
thing like nanny tax or tax on babysitter. Either search will bring up a slew of blog 
posts and articles discussing taxes on household employees, as well as several web-
sites for private companies that offer assistance both searching for childcare and 
planning for childcare taxes for a fee.193 A search for nanny tax will also bring up an 
IRS publication on household employees, although the taxpayer would have to scroll 
down the page past several other results to reach it.194 
Assume our taxpayer searched for nanny tax and then clicked on the first link in 
the search results, which is a page entitled Nanny Tax 101 on the website Care.com 
(a website where parents can find childcare providers and childcare providers can 
advertise their services).195 The site provides a summary of what kinds of workers 
are taxable household employees and a short description of what taxes need to be 
paid and what forms need to be filed.196 The site does not provide the user with links 
to any of the relevant forms and is presumably geared at encouraging customers to 
utilize Care.com’s fee-based payroll services rather than making the process of pay-
ing household employee taxes easy.197 At this point, our taxpayer may decide it’s 
worth the $1020 fee to enroll in Care.com’s program, which will essentially manage 
the employment taxes for him.198 But he may think this is too expensive and wish to 
handle the tax obligations himself.199 If he relies on the summary description on 
Care.com to provide him with information about the steps he must take, he must then 
go search and track down each of the relevant tax forms from the IRS. He would also 
                                                                                                             
 
in one quarter (along with possible state unemployment taxes). INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
DEP’T OF TREAS., PUB. 926, HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE 4 tbl.1 (2017) [hereinafter 
PUBLICATION 926]; see I.R.C. §§ 3111, 3301 (West 2011 & Supp. 2016). Whether a household 
worker is a taxable “employee” depends on a number of factors including, but not limited to, 
the amount paid for the services, the period of time spent working during the year, and the 
amount of control the employer has over the worker’s services. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
supra, at 3. 
 192. See I.R.S. Notice 2007-35, 2007-1 C.B. 940, 940–41 (“Common Mistakes on Tax Returns”). 
 193. See, e.g., CARE.COM, https://www.care.com; SITTERCITY, https://www.sittercity.com 
[https://perma.cc/7N4T-67DG]. 
 194. The phrase nanny tax generates over 300,000 results on Google.  The sixth result 
(including two paid advertisements) is IRS Publication 926. Nothing from the IRS or the 
government comes up on the first page of a search for tax on babysitter.  
 195. Tom Breedlove, Nanny Tax 101, CARE.COM, https://www.care.com/homepay/nanny 
-tax-guide [https://perma.cc/YN28-GDG7]. Care.com also offers a payroll service for its 
customers that takes care of things like paystubs and filing and collecting applicable federal 
and state employment taxes. The service costs $205 per quarter, plus $100 for year-end filing 
and $100 for initial setup. Service FAQs, CARE.COM HOMEPAY, https://www.care.com 
/homepay/service-faqs-1402251530 [https://perma.cc/L9A9-6AUG]. 
 196. Breedlove, supra note 195. 
 197. However, the site does provide two links to IRS descriptions of determining whether 
a household worker is an employee and applying for an employer identification number. Id. 
 198. See supra note 195. The taxpayer may also decide to turn to a paid tax-return preparer 
at this point for help. 
 199. Or he may decide at this point not to report his nanny at all. 
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likely need more information about which forms to file, how much tax to pay, and 
what else is required. 
After perusing private websites, or in lieu thereof, our taxpayer might turn to the 
IRS for more detailed help. A search for nanny tax on the IRS website or a Google 
search for nanny tax IRS both lead the taxpayer to several IRS publications, including 
Publication 926, Household Employer’s Tax Guide.200 Publication 926 is a dense, 
seventeen-page document with information about taxpayers’ employment tax obliga-
tions, including the applicable dollar thresholds, rates, forms, and deadlines. A 
taxpayer unfamiliar with the rules would likely need to spend hours digesting its 
contents. If our taxpayer makes it to page four,201 he would find a checklist at the 
bottom of various steps that must be taken to comply with the accompanying dead-
lines. He could presumably go back to the IRS website for each item on the checklist 
and download the relevant forms. He could also figure out the amount of employment 
tax he will owe by reading through the rules and doing the calculations manually. 
Combining all of these steps would be time-consuming and burdensome. If our tax-
payer were already on the fence about whether to report the nanny, he may give up 
somewhere during this process and decide it’s too much work. Further, reading 
through long descriptions of technical rules and searching for forms would likely be 
mentally depleting, making our taxpayer less prone to comply. 
There is much that could be done to make the process of reporting a household 
worker like a nanny more user-friendly. First, a Google (or other search engine) 
search of nanny tax or similar terms should send the taxpayer directly to an IRS 
page.202 The page should be designed as a one-stop shop where taxpayers can access 
all information and forms needed to comply with tax obligations relating to a house-
hold worker like a nanny. Taxpayers should also be able to access the page from their 
taxpayer accounts. For example, when entering information about dependents, the 
taxpayer account may prompt taxpayers to answer questions about childcare and 
provide links to related pages. 
The website itself should be designed using principles like those identified by 
experts in marketing and web design discussed above in Part IV.A. For example, 
given the propensity of users to scan, rather than read, and to ignore instructions, the 
most essential information should be bolded or highlighted. To minimize noise, de-
tailed information that would be relevant to only a minority of taxpayers should be 
left off the page altogether and accessible through a separate link.203 Rather than 
                                                                                                             
 
 200. PUBLICATION 926, supra note 191.  
 201. Id. at 4 tbl.2. This assumes the taxpayer is able to track down the pdf version of 
Publication 926. The first Google or IRS search results take the user to an html version of the 
publication, which is in small font and difficult to read. Publication 926 - Main Content, IRS 
(2017), https://www.irs.gov/publications/p926/ar02.html [https://perma.cc/5LZX-95MV]. 
 202. If one searches for enroll in healthcare or even just health care (but not healthcare) 
on Google, the first result is Healthcare.gov. Presumably, the IRS could redesign certain pages 
on their website to accomplish the same result. See generally GOOGLE, SEARCH ENGINE 
OPTIMIZATION STARTER GUIDE (2010), http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www 
.google.com/en/us/webmasters/docs/search-engine-optimization-starter-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/6D26-PF75].   
 203. For example, Publication 926 contains a section called “How Can You Correct 
Schedule H?” for taxpayers who have made reporting errors. PUBLICATION 926, supra note 
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forcing taxpayers to begin by reading summaries of rules, they might instead be navi-
gated through a checklist of questions requiring simple clicks.204 For example, the 
site might first present the taxpayer with a question such as: “Do I Have a Household 
Employee?” and allow them to read a short bulleted description under the “Yes” and 
“No” options. The next step might ask the taxpayer to estimate how much they will 
be paid a week to determine whether the applicable dollar thresholds for employment 
taxes are met, and so on.  
Once it is determined that the taxpayer does have a taxable household employee, 
they could be presented with a checklist of obligations similar to that provided by 
Publication 926.205 However, the checklist should automatically link the taxpayer to 
an online version of each form needed, with an option to file it electronically.206 It 
should also contain an online calculator that would automatically calculate the 
employment tax due by both the employer and employee (once the taxpayer inputs 
information like salary). Taxpayers should be given the option to make online pay-
ments as well, with a direct debit feature if they so elect. Ideally, the taxpayer would 
be able to save and store all of the relevant forms and records in his taxpayer account.  
b. Self-Employed Taxpayers 
The IRS should also pursue simplification measures that are particularly aimed at 
self-employed taxpayers, who face high procedural complexity because their income 
is generally not subject to withholding and information reporting. Online services 
offered by private banks may serve as a good model here. For example, many private 
banks offer customers a service that allows them to deposit checks into their personal 
checking accounts from home by taking a photo of the check with a tablet or cell 
phone; the bank’s software automatically uploads the information. The IRS could 
                                                                                                             
 
191, at 12–13. Rather than supplying all of this information on the website, there could be a 
clickable button or link that says “Made an Error?” that would lead the taxpayer to the relevant 
information. Access to the detailed rules in Publication 926 could be provided through links 
multiple times on the website.  
 204. See, e.g., supra note 110 and accompanying text. Of course, not all tax rules can be 
boiled down to a few simple bullets. The key would be to provide only information that is 
relevant to most taxpayers, with links to access further information applicable to particular 
situations. Further, some rules could be summarized on a very high level on the website but 
explained in more detail elsewhere for taxpayers who wanted more information. For example, 
rather than providing a taxpayer with descriptions of dollar thresholds (e.g., minimum salary 
of $2000 per year for employment taxes and social security maxing out at $127,200 per year, 
PUBLICATION 926, supra note 191, at 6), a taxpayer could simply enter in the expected annual 
salary on the website and be presented with the amount of tax that applies to her specific 
situation. Taxpayers who want to know the threshold levels for planning purposes might be 
able to click a link that says something like “Dollar thresholds for employment taxes.”   
 205. Those obligations include verifying the employee’s citizenship, obtaining an em-
ployer identification number, providing a Form W-2 to the employee, and filing Schedule H 
to Form 1040. PUBLICATION 926, supra note 191, at 4 tbl.2. 
 206. The Social Security Administration (SSA) website already provides electronic filing 
for Form W-2. Employer W-2 Filing Instructions & Information, SOC. SECURITY, https:// 
www.ssa.gov/employer/ [https://perma.cc/EU7S-EMGD]. However, a taxpayer searching the 
IRS website for this information will not be linked to the SSA website.  
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offer similar services to self-employed taxpayers to help them easily record income 
and expenses. Taxpayers could, for example, take pictures of invoices and receipts 
with their cellphones with an app, categorize the item by selecting from a menu of 
options, and then have the data automatically saved in their taxpayer accounts.207 The 
app might also have a “cash” feature that would allow the taxpayer to quickly log in 
something like a cash tip by typing in the amount on their cell phone. The expenses 
and income items would be reviewable at any time and not exported to the tax return 
until the taxpayer later chose to do so. Because the data would already be in their 
accounts, taxpayers should save significant time and effort when preparing their re-
turns at year-end.208 Taxpayers who might otherwise not report income because of 
sloppy record keeping may report more accurately. Additionally, by making accurate 
reporting easier, the service should encourage more honest reporting.  
These are just some examples of the many areas where the IRS could redesign the 
compliance process to be simpler and less burdensome. To encourage the use of new 
products and tools, the IRS might incentivize taxpayers by providing small tax re-
bates. The Determined Cheaters, who are committed to underreporting, are unlikely 
to be swayed by simplification. But making the process easier may encourage a num-
ber of reluctant Taxpayers On The Fence to comply.  
D. Potential Issues and Objections 
Critics may object to these proposals on a number of grounds, including that they 
may be costly with only speculative benefits. Others might argue that it is unneces-
sary for the IRS to make the taxpaying process easier for taxpayers in light of the 
prevalence of tax-return preparers and tax-preparation software. Finally, some might 
object to procedural simplification on theoretical grounds, arguing that it will 
undermine taxpayers’ substantive understanding of the tax laws. This Part addresses 
some of those concerns. 
1. Does Procedural Simplification Lack a Constituency?  
When considering measures like redesigning the IRS website or instituting 
taxpayer accounts, an important question to consider is whether there are a significant 
number of taxpayers who would benefit from these changes.  
a. Tax Return Preparers 
Critics might argue, for example, that the prevalence of paid tax return preparers 
makes some of these policy proposals irrelevant. But there are several reasons why 
the use of tax-return preparers does not detract from the importance of making the 
                                                                                                             
 
 207. Private companies, such as Shoeboxed.com, offer similar mobile record keeping ser-
vices (to “scan [and] organize receipts”) ranging from $120 to $1200/year. SHOEBOXED.COM, 
https://www.shoeboxed.com/ [https://perma.cc/92NZ-V5LQ]; Scalable Plans & Pricing, 
SHOEBOXED.COM, https://www.shoeboxed.com/pricing/ [https://perma.cc/SH7B-RGXF]. 
 208. Storing income and expense information electronically would also ensure the infor-
mation was backed up and wouldn’t be lost.  
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system more user-friendly for taxpayers. First, over forty percent of taxpayers cur-
rently prepare their own taxes.209 Simplification would impact these tens of mil-
lions210 of taxpayers directly and improve compliance.  
Second, more taxpayers might self-prepare if the process were easier. And while 
the use of tax-return preparers is likely beneficial from a compliance perspective for 
some taxpayers,211 there could be benefits to encouraging taxpayers with relatively 
uncomplicated tax situations (e.g., wage earners who claim the standard deduction 
or itemize few deductions) to self-prepare. Self-preparing would save taxpayers the 
cost of paying preparation fees212 and would also likely cut down on certain in-
efficiencies such as duplicated efforts between the taxpayer and the preparer. 
Additionally, empowering taxpayers to self-prepare by making the process easier 
(and cheaper) may engender more positive feelings about the tax system overall, 
which could also have a positive impact on voluntary tax compliance.  
Third, procedural simplification has merit even for those taxpayers who would 
continue to use a tax-return preparer. Those taxpayers still have to spend time and 
mental energy doing things like keeping records and collecting forms at the end of 
the year. There is still a risk that taxpayers who are overwhelmed by procedural 
complexity may not comply with their obligations, for example, by not giving rele-
vant information to their preparers. Thus, measures like data retrieval and taxpayer 
accounts could be hugely beneficial even for taxpayers who were not going to 
actually prepare their tax return. Additionally, taxpayers could have an option to 
authorize a tax professional to have access to their tax account to file their return and 
do things like communicate with the IRS or receive notices on their behalf.213 
Allowing tax professionals to share in the benefits of things like data retrieval and 
                                                                                                             
 
 209. For the tax year 2010, 40.78% of tax returns (approximately 56.7 million returns) 
were self-prepared. The percentages are similar for 2009 and for the first quarter of 2011. See 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF TREAS., PUB. 4822, TAXPAYER FILING ATTRIBUTE REPORT 
(2013), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4822.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6CA-QV6G]. The IRS 
has said more recently that the number of taxpayers electronically self-preparing is rising. 
More Taxpayers Filing from Home Computers in 2014, IRS (Mar. 13, 2014) [hereinafter More 
Taxpayers Filing], http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/More-Taxpayers-Filing-from-Home 
-Computers-in-2014--Many-Taxpayers-Eligible-to-Use-Free-File [https://perma.cc/J42U-SXEF] 
(increase from forty-two percent to forty-four percent of electronic filers from 2013 to 2014). 
 210. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 209. 
 211. The use of tax-return preparers might enhance compliance if individuals are more 
likely to be honest when a third party is involved. Additionally, compliance may be improved 
when preparers can help taxpayers understand the substance of their tax obligations. For exam-
ple, an accountant might inform a taxpayer that an item of income is reportable that the tax-
payer wouldn’t have otherwise known to report. Of course, taxpayers who use preparers might 
report less income overall if preparers help them claim more deductions and credits than they 
otherwise would or if their preparers encourage them to take aggressive tax positions. 
 212. There are fees for tax-preparation software like TurboTax, but they are generally 
lower than paying a professional to prepare your return. See, e.g., Sandra Block, More Taxpay-
ers Are Preparing Their Taxes on Their Own, USA TODAY (Apr. 14, 2010, 10:32 AM), http:// 
usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2010-04-14-1Ataxprep14_CV_N.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/82DK-ULJV].  
 213. This was recommended by the ETAAC in their 2014 Report to Congress. ELEC. TAX 
ADMIN. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 137, at 31. 
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online accounts would simplify the system for the professionals, the taxpayers, and 
the IRS.  
b. Tax-Preparation Software and E-Filing 
Another issue to consider is whether tax-preparation software already 
accomplishes the simplification goals discussed here. Currently, about one-third of 
taxpayers use tax-preparation software to self-prepare their tax returns.214 Although 
lower income taxpayers (currently, those with annual income below $64,000) are 
eligible for free access to tax-preparation software,215 other taxpayers must pay fees 
starting from $55 to $115 depending on the complexity of their tax situations, and 
increasing with each state return filed.216 For taxpayers who self-prepare online, tax-
preparation software undoubtedly simplifies the process and makes filing less 
burdensome. For example, taxpayers can save and review prior year returns, carry 
over relevant information to future years, and click through questionnaires to help 
them determine which tax rules apply to them. Software programs will also handle 
calculations and automatically apply rules like deduction phaseouts for the taxpayer.  
So what does the government’s involvement add here? First, the simplification 
proposals discussed above could be considered in conjunction with, not in lieu of, 
the use of commercial tax-preparation software. An essential component of taxpayer 
accounts would be access to online self-preparation services similar to what is cur-
rently offered from private software companies. To integrate online taxpayer ac-
counts with tax return preparation, the government could develop its own preparation 
software program that it could offer free of charge to all taxpayers.217 Or, if is deemed 
more cost-effective to continue to partner with private software companies, taxpayers 
could be directed to the private tax-preparation company of their choice from their 
taxpayer account, similar to the way low-income taxpayers can currently select free, 
                                                                                                             
 
 214. See Protecting Taxpayers from Incompetent and Unethical Return Preparers: Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. On Finance, 113th Cong. 131 (2014) (written testimony of John A. 
Koskinen, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Service) (“34 percent of taxpayers use tax preparation 
software . . . .”). 
 215. Free File: Do Your Federal Taxes for Free, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Free-File:-
Do-Your-Federal-Taxes-for-Free [https://perma.cc/A7DH-YF2S] (last updated Mar. 10, 
2017). 
 216. Products & Pricing, supra note 186. Although taxpayers above the income threshold 
have to pay for tax preparation software, all taxpayers can electronically file their returns for 
free with the IRS. For 2016 returns, TurboTax is offering free filing of all returns for taxpayers 
eligible to file a Form 1040EZ or 1040A. Absolute Zero – TurboTax Federal Free Edition, 
TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com/personal-taxes/online/free-edition.jsp [https://perma.cc 
/JTQ3-UUZU]. 
 217. This is the approach taken by the South African Revenue Service, which offers free 
online tax-preparation software to all taxpayers, as well as a mobile app for preparing one’s 
tax return. SARS E-FILING, http://www.sarsefiling.co.za/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/77H9-
J4KY]; SARS eFiling App & Mobi-Site, SARS, http://www.sars.gov.za/ClientSegments/Tax-
Practitioners/Pages/Smartphone-App.aspx [https://perma.cc/4FNA-38HS]. I am grateful to 
Eric Zolt for bringing this to my attention. 
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private online preparation services from the IRS website.218 Some specialized ser-
vices could still be offered for a fee, but all taxpayers should be able to self-prepare 
and e-file their tax return free of charge.219  
By offering online tax-preparation services free of cost, more taxpayers will be 
motivated to use them, which should improve compliance. But there is also a diver-
sity of interests among the government and private software companies that further 
justifies the government’s involvement here. Although private companies have 
greatly simplified many aspects of tax compliance, their ultimate goal is to create 
taxpayer reliance on the company’s fee-based services. The goal of the government, 
on the other hand, should be to empower taxpayers to successfully manage their tax 
affairs at the lowest cost possible.220 For many taxpayers (with simpler tax situa-
tions), the goal would be to enable them to easily manage their tax affairs with little 
or no paid assistance.221 Not only would this reduce compliance costs for taxpayers, 
but the government’s involvement in simplification could also have a powerful 
signaling effect. Taxpayers who perceive that the IRS is trying to make their lives 
easier may view paying taxes in a more positive light, which could further enhance 
voluntary compliance.  
The simplification proposals discussed here could also improve the process for 
those taxpayers who are already using tax-preparation software, even if the IRS chose 
to partner with those same private software companies. For example, the IRS could 
partner with companies like TurboTax to ensure that third-party data (e.g., 1099s) 
posted to taxpayer accounts could automatically be imported onto tax returns, thus 
                                                                                                             
 
 218. Currently, the free online tax-preparation services available to low-income taxpayers 
are offered through a partnership between the IRS and the “Free File Alliance,” a group of 
private software companies. Free File: About the Free File Alliance, IRS,  http://www.irs.gov 
/uac/About-the-Free-File-Alliance [https://perma.cc/Q6M9-N3P7] (last updated Dec. 2, 
2016). For a general discussion of the costs and benefits of outsourcing tax administration to 
the private sector, see Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Technology and Taxation in Develop-
ing Countries: From Hand to Mouse, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 791, 812–14 (2008). 
 219. There is a question, of course, of who would bear the cost of providing free tax-
preparation software to taxpayers who are currently ineligible to receive it. The software 
companies (like TurboTax) that are part of the Free File Alliance, see supra note 218, presuma-
bly found it beneficial to offer free tax preparation to those with incomes under $64,000. In 
this case, the IRS would also be presenting taxpayers with an “alliance” of software companies 
that the taxpayer could link to directly from their taxpayer account. It’s possible that, if the 
IRS required free basic tax-preparation services for all taxpayers as a condition to being a 
member of that alliance, software companies would oblige. It might be worth it to them if they 
could advertise and offer paid products that would reach a larger audience by virtue of their 
association with taxpayer accounts. Alternatively, the private software companies might be 
able to generate revenue from free tax-preparation services if they could sell online advertise-
ments that would appear during the course of the return preparation process.  
 220. Evidence of this conflict of interest can be seen in Intuit’s (the maker of TurboTax) 
fierce lobby against the California ReadyReturn and other proposed “simple return” measures. 
See supra notes 163, 165, and accompanying text. 
 221. Given the potential conflict of interest, it might make sense for the government to 
offer some (if not all) services directly. For example, even if the IRS relied on software compa-
nies for return preparation, it might offer cell phone and tablet applications (like one that would 
allow taxpayers to photograph receipts and invoices) directly. 
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saving taxpayers the procedural headache of accounting for and inputting data from 
various information returns when they self-prepare. Additionally, the IRS could 
encourage software preparation companies to allow rolling return entries to be made 
midyear to further simplify the process for taxpayers.222  
Further, the simplification proposals in this Article go beyond the tax return 
preparation process and thus apply beyond the reach of tax software companies. 
Measures like increasing information reporting or redesigning the IRS website to 
simplify recordkeeping for household employees will simplify taxpaying for 
individuals regardless of whether they use tax return preparation software.  
c. Taxpayers On The Fence 
Finally, critics might argue that, while procedural simplification has efficiency 
advantages, it will not promote better tax compliance because taxpayers who have 
an opportunity to cheat (e.g., the self-employed) will do so regardless of how simple 
the process is. In other words, one might claim that most taxpayers are Determined 
Cheaters and that Taxpayers On The Fence do not make up a meaningful portion of 
the population. It’s certainly true that taxpayers who earn income not subject to infor-
mation reporting or withholding demonstrate low compliance rates, both in the 
percentage of income reported as a group (less than half) and the percentage of 
taxpayers who underreport to some degree (roughly sixty percent).223 However, the 
IRS’s compliance data also indicates that a significant portion of taxpayers in this 
group—about forty percent—do report all of their income accurately.224 It should be 
stressed that this forty percent reports honestly notwithstanding very low audit rates 
(about three percent for the self-employed)225 and correspondingly low expected 
penalties for evasion. 
While the data supports the notion that a significant number of people are not 
Determined Cheaters, where does that leave Taxpayers On The Fence? IRS compli-
ance statistics alone can’t tell us which taxpayers will always report accurately or 
inaccurately (Honest Taxpayers and Determined Cheaters respectively) and which 
might be swayed in one direction or another depending on the circumstances. How-
ever, empirical studies showing that various behavioral interventions improve tax 
compliance lend support to the notion that some middle ground group of taxpayers 
must exist. For example, recent studies have shown that requiring individuals to sign 
a tax form at the top instead of the bottom results in better compliance;226 other stud-
ies have shown that verbal appeals to conscience or letters invoking social norms 
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also improve tax compliance.227 Because those behavioral interventions do not in-
volve an increase in the odds of detection or the penalty for evasion, improvements 
in compliance must come from Taxpayers On The Fence.228 While further study is 
certainly necessary to test whether procedural simplification itself would be an effec-
tive motivator among these taxpayers, similar studies of other behavioral interven-
tions indicate that such research is worthwhile. 
2. Is Procedural Simplification Cost-Effective? 
Critics might also argue that the simplification measures proposed here would be 
too costly to implement. Simplification undoubtedly would impose costs on third 
parties (in the case of information reporting, for example) and on the government (to 
design and implement taxpayer accounts, for example). The question, however, is 
whether those costs would be outweighed by the benefits of simplification.  
If simplifying the taxpaying process reduces mental depletion, then behavioral 
studies indicate that taxpayers would be more likely to behave honestly and less 
likely to behave passively, both of which should improve voluntary tax compliance 
and result in more tax revenue. Additionally, simplification could reduce taxpayer 
costs and enhance voluntary compliance in less direct ways. For example, it might 
reduce psychic costs like anxiety and frustration incurred by taxpayers in their 
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tion or penalty for evasion would not impact their compliance decisions. 
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interactions with the tax system. Procedural simplification might also promote posi-
tive attitudes about taxpaying that could foster more voluntary compliance. Increased 
tax compliance and simplified tax reporting should reduce the costs to the govern-
ment of tax collection and enforcement as well.  
Some taxpayers (i.e., Determined Cheaters) undoubtedly will continue to evade 
tax, perhaps because they believe they are unlikely to get caught or because they 
harbor negative feelings about the tax system. However, heterogeneity among 
taxpayers does not mean that simplification measures aren’t cost-effective. Increas-
ing voluntary compliance among even a minority of taxpayers over many years could 
justify the upfront costs of simplification.  
Procedural simplification should also reduce overall compliance costs for 
taxpayers, who collectively spend billions of hours each year attending to tax mat-
ters.229 For example, having the ability to export electronic data posted to a taxpayer 
account to a tax return should reduce the time spent by taxpayers collecting various 
forms and inputting information into their tax returns. An economist’s report on the 
“Simple Return” estimated that it would save 225 million hours of time and over two 
billion dollars in tax-preparation fees each year, with an overall reduction of compli-
ance costs worth forty-four billion dollars over ten years.230 The potentially massive 
reduction in time and other resources spent by taxpayers may alone justify the cost 
of procedural simplification measures, with enhanced voluntary compliance only 
adding further benefits to the fisc. 
With respect to costs imposed on third parties, IRS data shows that requiring 
information reporting has a strong positive impact on tax compliance,231 and the 
compliance benefit alone might outweigh the costs of expanding information report-
ing.232 Additionally, automatic online reporting of income and deductions could re-
duce the social costs of tax compliance overall because large third parties (banks, for 
example) can likely compile that information more efficiently than individual 
taxpayers.  
In terms of costs imposed on the government, the goal would again be for overall 
benefits to outweigh the associated costs of procedural simplification. Even weighing 
the implementation costs against increased tax revenues alone, the report on the sim-
ple return concludes that tax agency reconciliation filing “would have little cost and 
might even save the IRS money by reducing the error rate of filers.”233 And the bene-
fits identified in the report—increased accuracy and reduction in overall taxpayer 
compliance costs—don’t even take into account the added benefits of higher volun-
tary compliance rates and spillover effects like less taxpayer anxiety and frustration. 
All of these benefits combined would result in reduced social costs and increased tax 
revenue going forward, which should outweigh upfront costs associated with design-
ing and implementing measures like taxpayer accounts or user-friendly web tools. 
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Presumably, the same cost-benefit analysis led the IRS to undertake the My IRS 
Account project in 2006, and is the reason the ETAAC has continued to advocate for 
taxpayer accounts. 
Critics might also argue that the enhanced voluntary compliance benefits 
identified in this Article are too tenuous. For example, they might claim that studies 
on mental depletion do not necessarily apply to taxpayer behavior, or that some 
taxpayers will continue to report dishonestly even if the process is made simpler. 
Further study certainly needs to be undertaken to understand the relationship between 
mental depletion and tax compliance behavior. Although one study has demonstrated 
tax complexity impacts whether taxpayers make choices that optimize income,234 a 
similarly designed study might instead measure whether taxpayers honestly report 
income or deductions when confronted with a complex tax system. But the need for 
further research does not render simplification unworthy, but rather means that policy 
makers should proceed with caution. For example, rather than implementing 
simplification measures broadly, the government might conduct pilot programs of 
measures like taxpayer accounts to determine their impact on voluntary 
compliance.235  
3. Does Procedural Simplification Undermine Tax Consciousness? 
Finally, critics could argue that, at a certain point, procedural simplification might 
make things too easy. The result could be that managing our tax affairs becomes so 
mindless and automatic that it undermines our tax consciousness and detracts from 
the fiscal citizenship benefits of paying taxes.236 For example, relying on computer 
software or online tools to make calculations may allow taxpayers to prepare their 
tax returns without understanding the substantive rules that apply to them.237 
Although tax-preparation software already poses this risk under our current system, 
the procedural simplification proposals discussed here could further exacerbate the 
problem. 
 However, as commentators have pointed out, tax complexity also undermines tax 
consciousness.238 Taxpayers may feel disconnected from and resentful of the tax sys-
tem if they do not understand the rules that apply to them and if they are mired in 
burdensome reporting and record keeping requirements. The relevant question, then, 
is how the procedural simplification proposals discussed here would impact the sta-
tus quo: would procedural simplification further reduce tax consciousness or would 
it improve things? 
Research on the human brain, mental depletion, and consumer behavior points 
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towards a common theme: above almost everything else, we want things to be easy. 
Other virtues like fairness, democracy, and efficiency will be lost on taxpayers who 
decide to disengage with the tax system as much as possible because of the mental 
effort required. Studies showing that our mental resources are limited indicate that 
taxpayers will not even be able to appreciate the substance of the rules that apply to 
them if the process of learning those rules or otherwise complying with their obliga-
tions is too draining. Thus, simplifying the process of taxpaying is a necessity if we 
want to promote more tax consciousness. That’s not to say that simplification will 
not continue to enable taxpayers to meet their obligations without a full understand-
ing of the laws. But this may be the lesser of two evils: encouraging taxpayers to 
engage with the tax system by making things easier is surely preferable to a system 
that discourages engagement by requiring mental stamina to participate. 
CONCLUSION 
Improving voluntary tax compliance would generate much needed tax revenue for 
the government. One promising means of encouraging more individuals to voluntar-
ily comply is to simplify the process of paying taxes. As things currently stand, our 
taxpaying obligations are mentally exhausting and collectively consume immense 
amounts of time and financial resources. Empirical studies show that, not only do we 
have a strong preference for simplicity in our daily lives, but mental exhaustion 
drives us to behave passively and makes us more likely to cheat. Improvements in 
technology over the past few decades present an opportunity to vastly simplify many 
aspects of taxpaying, for example, by allowing taxpayers to easily record, access, 
and report their income and deductions online. Easing the burden of taxpaying should 
encourage more taxpayers to report honestly. Additionally, a tax system that is more 
user-friendly would reduce compliance costs for taxpayers and enforcement costs for 
the government. At the same time, it could be an important step towards restoring 
positive attitudes about our civic duty to pay taxes.  
 
